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THE LABOR LAW ASPECTS OF FRANCHISING
RAYMOND G. MCGUIRE*
"Franchising'" as a marketing technique has increased signifi-
cantly in the past two decades. Used predominantly by the automo-
bile industry in the early part of this century, 2
 franchised outlets now
distribute a wide variety of goods and services ranging from soft ice
* Associate Professor of Law, Florida State University; Member of the New York
Bar; B,S , Canisius College, 1960; LL.B., Harvard University, 1964; LL.M., Columbia
University, 1968.
1
 The attempts to define "franchising" are unending. In combination, they do indicate
the outer boundaries of the territory surveyed in this article. For example: "[T]he
definition [of franchising] has broadened to include 'any contract under which independent
retailers or wholesalers are organized to act in concert with each other or with manufac-
turers to distribute given products or services.' Typically, the franchisee agrees to operate
his business within certain prescribed limitations and in keeping with agreed-on buying
and merchandising programs." Hall, Franchising—New Scope for an Old Technique, 42
Harv. Bus. Rev. 60, 62 (Jan.-Feb. 1964).
"At one extreme ... [franchising] is a simple grant from one party to another to sell the
granting party's goods. At the other extreme, a franchise relationship is a comprehensive
business arrangement in which the franchisor licenses his trade name and trademark; [sic]
imparts, in confidence, his know-how, and on a continuing basis, provides guidance and
details concerning the precise manner in which the franchisee must operate his establish-
ment." Report of Ad Hoc Committee on Franchising, in The Franchising Sourcebook
561, 564 (J. McCord ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as Report of Ad Hoc Committee]. In
the bill proposed by Senator Hart to confer rights on franchisees, a "franchise" was defined
as "a contract, agreement, or understanding between two persons that involves a con-
tinuing commercial relationship between them and that grants to one person, .. . 'the
franchisee', the right to offer, sell, and distribute goods, services or commodities manufac-
tured, processed, disttlibuted or (in the case of services) organized and directed by the
other person, . . . called 'the franchisor'. . ." Hearings on S. 2507 and S. 2321 Before the
Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess., 5 (1967) [hereinafter cited as 1967 Hearings].
Others define a franchise as "a grant by a manufacturer to a distributor to deal in the
manufacturer's goods, usually within a designated territory and through a written docu-
ment." Id. at 131. Still another definition is that a franchise is "a license with ownership
rights . . . intended to be a permanent arrangement." Id. at 153. It may well be true that
"[t]he term 'franchise' as used in the business world, has been applied so indiscriminately,
and to such diverse business arrangements, as to defy consistent definition." Id.
2 See C. Hewitt, Automobile Franchise Agreements (1956), for a thorough history and
analysis of the use of franchising in the automobile industry.
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cream to executive recruitment.3
 While precise statistics' are unavail-
able, it has been estimated that franchises account for ten percent of
the gross national product and twenty-five percent of all retail sales.'
Although franchising has been enthusiastically acclaimed by the busi-
ness community,5
 its increased use has spawned a plethora of legal
problems. Questions have been raised concerning the legality of cer-
tain of its aspects in light of antitrust laws,' securities regulations,'
8
 See Lewis and Hancock, The Franchise System of Distribution 85-87 (Univ. of
Minnesota 1963), reprinted in Hearings on S. Res. 40 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust
and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, 279,
371-73 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Lewis and Hancock, 1965 Hearings].
4
 1967 Hearings, supra note 1, at 1. These statistics, used by Senator Hart, as well as
virtually all other figures and percentages quoted to celebrate or condemn franchising,
apparently represent educated guesses: the reader is rarely guided to a primary source by
their users. For example, Jerome Fels, Associate Editor of the International Franchise
Association Legal Bulletin, has suggested that the number of franchise outlets in this
country exceeds 450,000. In support of his figures, he cited an article by Zeidrnan, Anti-
trust Aspects of Franchising, 45 Mich. St. D.J. 27 (1966). Zeidman was then general
counsel to the Small Business Administration. Fels, Franchising; Legal Problems and the
Business Framework of Reference—An Overview, in The Franchising Sourcebook 1, 2,
note 3 (J. McCord ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as Fels].
Another source cited by Fels, the editors of Modern Franchising, reported in 1968 that
an unnamed director of "a substantial franchising organization" had stated in a seminar
that "[franchising is a $70 billion business" that it was responsible for 25% of all retail
sales through more than 500,000 dealers, and was growing at the rate of $15 billion a year.
Id. at 2 note 4. Other commentators, however, without revealing their sources, note that
$50 billion represents sales by automobile dealers and gasoline service station operators.
Report of Ad Hoc Committee, supra note 1, at 565-66. See also Lewis and Hancock, 1965
Hearings, supra note 3, at 373, for detailed figures on the volume of business generated
by franchised car dealers and gasoline service station operators.
The major problem faced by both popular commentators and scholars lies in the
impreciseness of the term "franchising." See note 1 supra. For a discussion of the
general problems involved in gathering accurate statistics, see Bond, Franchise Statistics:
Their Uses and Abuses, in Franchising Today 44 (C. Vaughn ed. 1969).
5 "The dynamic growth of franchising during the last two decades is ample testimony
to its legitimacy. . . . Not only has franchising proved to be a superior method to
distribute goods and services, it has also proven to be the last frontier of the small
businessman." Remarks of Robert M. Rosenberg, President of Dunkin' Donuts of
America, Inc., 1967 Hearings, supra note 1, at 177. "Thus, franchising will truly emerge
as the model citizen in what has been described by John Kenneth Galbraith as the 'new
industrial state.'" Statement of Jerome Shuman, associate professor, Howard Univ. Law
School, id. at 356. See also Lewis and Hancock, 1965 Hearings, supra note 3, at 371-78.
0 The antitrust problems generated by franchising are several. The territorial restrictions
frequently included in franchise agreements, whereby a franchisee is licensed as the
exclusive dealer in a given geographical market, at the same time being prohibited from
intruding into other franchisees' territories, have been considered by the Supreme Court
in two important cases: White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963), and
United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967). In White the Court indicated
that it would apply the "rule of reason" to determine the legality of territorial restrictions
in a vertical arrangement under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 372 U.S. at 263. In
Schwinn the Court held that Schwinn's territorial and customer restraints were "unreason-
able without more" because of their adverse effect on competition. 388 U.S. at 379.
However, while holding that post-sale restraints will almost invariably be found illegal
in the ordinary purchase-sale distribution scheme, the Court did indicate that restrictions
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are permissible where the manufacturer or sellei retains ownership of the goods consigned
to his distributors. Id. at 382.
Customer restrictions, through which the franchisor often carves out institutional con-
sumers from the franchisees' geographical entitlement for his own exploitation and profit,
were also involved in White and Schwinn and were condemned by the Court in Schwinn.
Id. at 379.
Horizontal territorial allocations made through the instrumentality of a trademark
licensor were struck down by the Court in United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350
(1967), where the allocations were part of horizontal price fixing agreements. But it should
be noted that neither Schwinn nor Sealy condemned the ordinary quality-control restric-
tion placed by trademark licensors on licensees to protect the marks. This is an important
point because many franchising arrangements involve trademark and service mark
licensing. See Report of Ad Hoc Committee, supra note 1, at 588; see also McCarthy,
Trademark Franchising and Antitrust: The Trouble with Tie-Ins, 58 Calif. L. Rev. 1085
(1970).
A combination between a newspaper company and its dealers to fix maximum prices
was held illegal per se in Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968). See also Temperato
v. Horstman, 321 S.W.2d 657 (1959), where an agreement between a franchisor and
franchisee giving the franchisor the authority to set retail prices was held violative of
Missouri antitrust law.
Cases involving tying arrangements in the franchise context have been rare since, under
franchise contracts, products are usually sold as part of a total package. See, e.g., Susser
v. Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 505 (2d. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 125 (1965). Although
the court of appeals rested its holding that the defendants had violated neither § 3 of the
Clayton Act nor § 1 of the Sherman Act by requiring franchisees to purchase ice cream mix
and supplies from designated sources on the absence of proof of market dominance, the dis-
trict court had indicated that the designation of sources was imposed on the franchisees
solely to protect the good will and trademark of Carve!. Susser v. Carvel Corp., 206 F.
Supp. 636, 645 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). But cf. Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel
Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969) ; see also Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 847 (N.D.
Cal. 1970) where the court found that an arrangement requiring franchisees to buy pack-
aging items, cookers and fryers, and certain mix preparations from the franchisor was a
tying agreement in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. The court accepted the
possibility that the tying might be necessary to protect the good will of the trademark, but
the jury found, in a special verdict, that the particular requirement had not been justified
by the franchisor. It should also be noted that in Siegel the franchisor himself sold the
franchisees the tied supplies, while in Susser the franchisor merely designated acceptable
sources of supply.
Problems involving exclusive selling, exclusive buying, territorial restrictions and quality
controls have also arisen under the Federal Trade Commission Act. For an excellent
general discussion of legal problems faced by franchisors and franchisees under the Act,
see Report of Ad Hoc Committee, supra note 1.
Specific antitrust issues arising with respect to pricing and promotional activities of
franchisors, as well as the dangers of dual distribution used by some franchisors, are
discussed in the context of the Robinson-Patman Act in McCord, Applicability of the
Price and Promotional Provisions of Robinson-Patman and the Antitrust Implications of
Dual Distribution in the Franchising Context, The Franchising Sourcebook 471 (J.
McCord ed. 1970).
On the general antitrust issues raised by franchising, see Jones, The Growth and
Importance of Franchising and the Role of Law, 12 Antitrust Bull. 717 (1967) ; Keck,
Alternative Distribution Techniques—Franchising, Consignment, Agency, and Licensing,
13 Antitrust Bull. 177 (1968) ; McLaren, Marketing Limitations on Independent Dis-
tributors and Dealers—Prices, Territories, Customers, and Handling of Competitive
Products, 13 Antitrust Bull. 161 (1968).
7 The first question that arises under the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a at seq.
(1970), is whether a franchise is a "security." Only a few decisions have discussed this
issue and none of.them has squarely answered it. See SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S.
217
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
the Lanham Act,9
 the Uniform Commercial Code,° state agency laws"
and the federal tax code." These issues have received the careful at-
tention of lawyers and scholars and the scrutiny of congressional com-
mittees."
Relatively little attention, however, has been directed to legal
issues raised by franchising and related distribution systems under
federal labor law. This lack of interest is probably attributable to the
relatively limited number of cases that squarely present labor law
293 (1946); Tucker Corp., 26 S.E.C. 249 (1947); Belhumeur v. Dawson, 229 F. Supp. 78
(D. Mont. 1964); see also Coleman, A Franchise Agreement: Not a "Security" Under the
Securities Act of 1933, 22 Bus. Law. 493 (1967); Goodwin, Franchising in the Economy:
The Franchise Agreement as a Security Under Securities Acts, Including 10b-5 Considera-
tions, 24 Bus. Law 1311 (1969).
The more worrisome problem for the franchisor is his potential liability under the
vastly expanded antifraud provisions of 10b-5 for the misrepresentations of his security-
issuing franchisee. See id, at 1321-24. No case has yet raised this issue, For a discussion of
possible problems arising under one state's "blue sky" laws, see Note, Franchise Regulation
Under the California Corporate Securities Law, 5 San Diego L. Rev. 140 (1968).
8
 15 U.S.C. H 1051 et seq. (1970); see, e.g., McDonald's Corp. v. Moore, 363 F.2d
435 (5th Cir. 1966); Burger King of Florida, Inc. v. Brewer, 244 F. Supp. 293 (W.D.
Tenn. 1965); Treece, Trademark Licensing and Vertical Restraints in Franchising Arrange-
ments, 116 U. Pa. L. Rev, 435 (1968).
0 Hewitt, Termination of Dealer Franchises and the Code—Mixing Classified and
Coordinated Uncertainty with Conflict, 22 Bus. Law. 1075 (1967). See also Note, Article
Two of the Uniform Commercial Code and Franchise Distribution Agreements, 1969 Duke
L.J. 959 (1969).
10
 A representative sampling of the problems that may arise regarding contract and tort
liability under state statutes and common law is presented in the "Arthur Murray" series
of cases: People v, Arthur Murray, Inc., 238 Cal. App. 2d 333, 47 Cat Rptr. 700 (1965);
Beck v. Arthur Murray, Inc., 245 Cal. App. 2d 976, 54 Cal. Rptr. 328 (1966); Nichols v.
Arthur Murray, Inc., 248 Cal. App. 2d 610, 56 Cal. Rptr. 728 (1967) ; Porter v. Arthur
Murray, Inc., 249 Cal. App. 2d 410, 57 Cal. Rptr. 554 (1967). The California courts have
used several theories to find an agency relationship in order to determine the liability of
the franchisor for the contractual obligations of franchisees under California's Dance Act:
the ostensible agency relationship created by a failure to disclaim an agency relationship
(Beck), the aiding and abetting by the franchisor of the franchisee's illegal acts (People),
and the de facto controls retained by a franchisor as an undisclosed principal of the
franchisee (Nichols and Porter).
11 The issue of a franchisor's legal relationship with his franchisee arises in connection
with the Internal Revenue Code in determining whether a franchisee is an employee of the
franchisor for the Federal Insurance Contributions Act, ht. Rev. Code of 1954 H 3101
et seq.; the Federal Unemployment Tax Act, Int. Rev. Code of 1954 §§ 3301 et seq.;
and the withholding provisions, Int. Rev. Code of 1954 H 3401 et seq. See also the detailed
regulations dealing with specific classes of employees, Treas. Reg. § 31.401(c) (1957), and
employers, Treas. Reg. § 31.3401(d), (1957), for purposes of the withholding provisions.
The basic test is stated in Tress. Reg. § 31.3401(c)-1(b) (1957) as follows:
Generally the relationship of employer and employee exists when the person for
whom services are performed has the right to control and direct the individual '
who performs the services, not only as to the result to be accomplished by the
work but also as to the details and means by which the result is accomplished. .
alt is not necessary that the employer actually direct or control the manner in
which the services are performed; it is sufficient if he has the right to do so.
12 Lewis and Hancock, 1965 Hearings, supra note 3; 1967 Hearings, supra note 1.
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problems arising from "true franchising."" To some extent the paucity
of litigation is due to the failure of the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB) and the courts to recognize franchising as a distinct
type of business association. Consequently, many cases actually in-
volving franchising are not differentiated from those involving other
business associations.
This is not to say, however, that a wide range of labor issues has
not arisen in the field of franchising. On the contrary, the problems
arising in this type of business activity have run the gamut of ordinary
labor law issues. Franchisors have refused to recognize unions," vio-
lated employees' rights," discriminatorily terminated employees' and
failed to bargain in good faith." Not surprisingly, they have in turn
been picketed" and struck."
However, it is not the purpose of this article to discuss the prob-
lems which franchisors have in common with other employers; rather,
its main concern is to consider those labor law issues which have sig-
nificant implications in the franchising field. Particular emphasis will
be placed on the question of the applicability of the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA) to the franchise relationship.
The thesis of the article is that although the NLRA is properly
applicable to the franchise relationship, in many instances, the concepts
of Agency law upon which the NLRB primarily relies to determine its
jurisdiction over various types of franchises do not adequately reflect
the economic realities of modern franchising relationships. A more real-
istic approach would require the Board to measure the legal significance
of the franchisor-franchisee relationship in economic terms. The deter-
mination of whether a franchisee is an employee of the franchisor
should be made on the basis of the franchisee's capital investment and
on his freedom to assign his investment interest for a profit, rather
than on the quantum of managerial control retained by the franchisor.
The question of whether a franchisor is the joint employer of the fran-
chisee's employees should turn on the continuing financial involvement
13
 "True franchising" is a phrase usually reserved for those arrangements which
involve the licensing by a franchisor of a total marketing system, including the product or
service, to a franchisee. The "true franchise" system is represented by "fast food" enter-
prises such as McDonald's Hamburgers, Howard Johnson restaurants, Chicken Delight,
. Dunkin' Donuts, and Dairy Queen.
U-Tote M of Oklahoma, Inc., 172 N.L.R.B. No. 21, 68 L.R.R.M. 1393 (1968).
15 Id.
16
 Manley Transfer Co., Inc., 164 N.L.R.B. No. 21, 65 L.R.R.M. 1194 (1967) enf'd
390 F.2d 777 (8th Cir. 1968).
17 Ramanda Inns, Inc., 171 N.L.R.B. No. 115, 68 L.R.R.M. 1209 (1968).
18 Seven-Up Bottling Co. v. Soft Drink Distributors Ass'n, 73 L.R.R.M. 2158
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1969).
10 Carpenters, Local 2265 (Carpet Center, Inc.), 170 N.L.R.B. No. 93, 67 L.R.R.M.
1557 (1968).
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of the franchisor and the power be has to protect this interest by direct
or indirect means, rather than on the franchisor's right to control the
labor relations of the franchisee.
I. THE FRANCHISE ARRANGEMENT
Franchising is not an industry; it is a multi-level marketing tech-
nique employed by many different businesses, each with unique tech-
nology, marketing opportunities and problerns. 2° While the reasons
for its usage vary considerably, franchising is most often adopted by
companies interested in increasing sales but lacking the capital and
sales outlets to attempt a major program of growth and expansion.'
Through the use of franchising, the expansion-minded enterprise can
both enlarge its capital base—by charging initial franChising fees—
and increase its sales income—by providing an additional outlet for
its goods or services—while at the same time ensuring close, enthusi-
astic supervision of the retail outlet by profit-motivated franchisees.
Thus, the franchise technique affords a possible cure for the problems
which frequently plague small business enterprises—inadequate cap-
italization and poor middle-management personnel."
The heart of the franchise method of distribution is the sym-
biotic relationship between the franchisor and franchisee. The fran-
chisee's investment in the franchise is a salient characteristic of this
relationship." As his investment increases, the franchisee more closely
resembles an independent businessman and the franchise arrangement,
a vendor-vendee relationship. But the franchisee is not merely a yen-
20 Statement of Robert Rosenberg, President of Dunkin' Donuts of America, Inc.,
1967 Hearings, supra note 1, at 177.
21 Lewis and Hancock, 1965 Hearings, supra note 3, at 300.
22 Id. at 300-01. "Generally, the failure of a small business in the early stages is
attributable to poor location, inadequate financing, poor products, inadequate sales
representations, and other technical problems. However, as the firm expands, the major
problem of survival is management ineptitude. . . ." Basil, Managerial Problems of the
Enterprise, A Symposium on Small Business, 18 Vand. L. Rev. 1733, 1745-46 (1965).
23 The amounts invested by franchisees vary considerably, depending upon the type
of product or service distributed, the location, the potential sales volume and the success
of related franchisees. Lewis and Hancock state that the capital requirements of franchisees
vary from Jess than $1,000 to over $100,000, and can even vary considerably within the
same franchise organization "depending on the scale of operations which the franchisee
wishes to establish." Lewis and Hancock, 1965 Hearings, supra note 3, at• 307. See also
1967 Hearings, supra note 1: Robert Half Personnel Agencies—total cost of $7,500, initial
payment of $2,500, id. at 154; Dunkin' Donuts—total investment of $13,000, id. at 178.
The amount of control over the investment will also vary according to the particular
franchise agreement. For example, some agreements allow the franchisor to terminate on
30 days' notice and "become the absolute owner" of the tangible property used in the
franchise. Lewis and Hancock, 1965 Hearings, supra note 3, at 351. Other agreements
provide for cancellation on cause and require repayment for the depreciated value of all
equipment taken. Id. at 350. The agreements also have different approaches to the
alienability of franchisees' interests, varying from outright prohibitions of any assignment,
to a requirement that the franchisee obtain the franchisor's prior agreement. Id. at 349.
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dor for the goods or services provided by the franchisor; he imple-
ments a whole integrated system designed to market successfully the
franchisor's products or services. Consequently, the franchisor insists ,
upon a continuing managerial relationship to ensure that his system
of doing business is effectively executed by the franchisee. 24 As the
degree of his managerial control increases, the franchisee begins to
resemble an employee and the franchise arrangement, an employment
relationship. This combination of franchisor control and franchisee
investment is the distinctive characteristic of the franchise relation-
ship. The degree to which each of these factors is present in a par-
ticular franchise depends largely upon the needs and desires of the
franchisor; these needs and desires are in turn reflected in the terms
of the franchise agreement. Since these terms also provide, in part,
the factual basis which determines the applicability of the NLRA,.
an examination of the formation of the franchise and the franchise
agreement will assist in the succeeding analysis of labor law problems.
The initial step in the creation of a franchise is the perfection
of a "distribution package" by a manufacturer or wholesaler, either
through trial and error or through collaboration with a consulting
team. After the distribution package is developed, suitable candidates
are recruited and selected as franchisees and an agreement is nego-
tiated detailing the mutual rights and obligations of the parties.
The negotiations are dominated by the franchisor; typically, the
prospective franchisee has no alternative but to accept or reject the
proposed franchise contract. Although the franchisee is free to consult
an attorney, the latter is rarely in a position to negotiate substantial
changes in the agreement and usually can do little more than explain
the legal implications of the contract. Most franchisors realize that
it would create a dangerous precedent to fashion their agreements
to the individual needs and talents of each franchisee."
24 A typical franchise agreement provides that:
Licensee shall not dispense, sell or offer for sale in his stare at said location, under
the trade name "Dari-Delite," or related trade-marks, or otherwise, any item or
product that does not conform to such standards and specifications of proportions,
appearance, quality, coloring, flavoring or other ingredients or characteristics as
from time to time may be prescribed by Dad in writing or otherwise to Li-
censee. . . Licensee shall purchase all fixtures, equipment, foods, beverages and
supplies . . . from such suppliers as are designated by Dad from time to time to
be qualified suppliers for all Dari-Delite operations in the same general area in
which Licensee is located.
Lewis and Hancock, 1965 Hearings, supra note 3, at 322-23.
26 C. Rosenfield, Organizing and Advising Small Florida Businesses, ch. 22 (Florida
Practice Manual No, 10, 1969) [hereinafter cited as Rosenfield]."The terms and conditions
of the franchise agreement are inviolate. The franchise company cannot make changes or
concessions for one dealer and not for others. . . . The stringent adherence to a single
contract is • . . an indication of the-strength and philosophy of the franchisor. Weakness
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The Standard franchise agreement covers a variety of matters,
but the important clauses of the contract which structure.the franchise,
relationship may be summarized and described as follows:
(1) Property rights in the franchise.
—One or • more clauses de-
scribe the terms upon which various kinds of tangible and intangible
property involved in the enterprise are licensed, leased, sold or
consigned to the. franchisee."
(2) Duration of the contract.—The contract may run from one
month to twenty years, although most contracts extend for a period of
one year with an option to renew. The shorter period is preferred by
franchisors because it allows an adjustment of fees, charges and
royalties according to varying market conditions."
(3) Territorial restrictions.
—In some industries and geographical
areas, the assurance of an exclusive territory is an effective, perhaps
necessary, inducement to persuade the franchisee to risk what is, for
him, a substantial investment. The right to operate without compe-
tition in a given territory invariably involves a corresponding obli-
gation to respect the exclusive territories assigned to other franchisees.
Territorial restrictions also allow the franchisor to achieve max-
imum market saturation for his product." In the case of "single
through change indicates a company who will submit to later acts of coercion by its
dealers." Id. at 22.27.
26
 In the "Mister Donut" Dealer Franchise Agreement, for example, clause 1 states:
"The Company hereby grants unto the Dealer and the Dealer hereby accepts a franchise
as a Mister Donut dealer at the Dealer's premises . . . with the right to use ... the
Company's trade names, trade-marks, insignias and the design and color scheme of
Mister Donut Shops and their accessories, together with the Company's doughnut
and other formulae, and the Company's production, advertising and merchandising
methods ...."
Clause 15 provides: "Upon the termination of this agreement for any cause, the
Dealer shall immediately discontinue the use of all trade names, trademarks, signs, struc-
tures and forms of advertising indicative of Mr. Donut, its symbols or trademarks or its
business or products." H. Kursh, The Franchise Boom, 207-08, 213 (1962).
Most franchise agreements between parties in the service sponsor-retailer category
contain similar clauses. See, for example, the numerous franchise agreements in Lewis and
Hancock, 1965 Hearings, supra note 3, at 401-55. Some franchise agreements make the
franchisee a lessee of the premises, subject to eviction upon termination of the franchise;
see Rosenfield, supra note 25, 4 22.45.
Since the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388
U.S. 365 (1967), more franchisors may be desirous of retaining title to merchandise
distributed through the franchisee in order to avoid possible antitrust violations.
27 See Rosenfield, supra note 25, 22.30.
28 See, e.g., the territorial assignment clause used by Whitehill Systems, Inc., with
one of its dealers:
The DISTRIBUTOR'S territory shall be confined to:
Fairfield county in its entirety within the State of Connecticut. Plus,
all that area within the County of Westchester, lying east of Route 22, com-
mencing at the Bronx County line and running in a northerly direction to
the Putnam County line within the State of New York.
Lewis and Hancock, 1965 Hearings, supra note 3, at 419.
The problem of writing exclusive ,_territorial grants; into franchise ,agreements raises
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distributor" franchises, the franchisor's power over territory is
expressed in terms of his authority to control the location and size
of a geographic segment or route. The power may include the right
to reevaluate periodically the franchisee's routes and to require the
franchisee to purchase additional equipment or else face a reduction
in the route.28
(4) Financial obligations of the franchisee.
—
The franchisee is
required to pay franchise fees,3° royalty payments—generally ex-
pressed as a percentage of gross sales,8' minimal supply orders—
usually requiring the franchisee to make a certain quantum of pur-
chases at fixed or unilaterally determined prices, 82
 rental payments,
property and liability insurance premiums" and fees for continuing
services provided by the franchisor, such as bookkeeping and ad-
vertising."
(5) Standards for the conduct of the franchise.
—Prescribed
standards may be set forth in the agreement, but more often they
are incorporated by reference into a "policy manual" published by
the franchisor." The manual may be general, perhaps containing
useful suggestions for the general operation of the business; on the
other hand, it may be meticulous in detail, describing every oper-
ation and process involved in the conduct of the franchise." The
standards covered in the policy manual often include such diverse
matters as the hours of required operation37
 and the proportions to
be used in preparing batter for broiled chicken." The agreement
delicate legal problems for the franchisor. Fortunately there is no dearth of literature on
the practical and legal problems generated by territorial restraints. Most of the literature
is a gloss on the Supreme Court's decisions in the White, Schwinn and Sealy cases, note
6 supra.
29 See, e.g., Mister Softee of Indiana, 162 N.L.R.B. No. 22, 64 L.R.R.M. 1034 (1966),
where the franchisor not only assigned an original route but also retained the right to
reevaluate the route after two years and to require the franchisee to purchase another
truck or to reduce the route,
80
 Van Cise, A Franchise Contract, in The Franchising Sourcebook 95, 100-01 (J.
McCord ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as Van Cise].
31 Id. at 108-09.
32 Lewis and Hancock, 1965 Hearings, supra note 3, at 417, See also Mister Softee
of Indiana, 162 N.L.R.B. No. 22, 64 L.R.R.M. 1034 (1966), where the franchisor required
the franchisee to purchase a certain number of gallons of ice cream mix each year, to prod
the franchisee to maximize sales.
33
 The Dog House, Inc., Operator's Agreement, VI 8 and 9, Lewis and Hancock, 1965
Hearings, supra note 3, at 409.
84 Duraclean Dealership Franchise Agreement If 8, Lewis and Hancock, 1965
Hearings, supra note 3, at 423. See also Southland Corp., 170 N.L.R,B. No. 159, 67
L.R.R.M. 1582-83 (1968).
815 Van Cise, supra note 30, at 103.
30
 Id. See also Southland Corp., 170 N.L.R.B. No. 159, 67 L.R.R.M. 1582, 1583
(1968).
37 Lewis and Hancock, 1965 Hearings, supra note 3, at 321.
38 Id. at 322.
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may also require the franchisee to purchase his supplies from spec-
ified sources. The designation of supply sources reflects the fran-
chisor's interest in ensuring quality control of the product sold under
his trademark. A product of consistent .quality is necessary for the
protection of the investment in the franchise system, and a monitor-
ing of this quality is necessary both to preserve trademark rights
and to avoid charges of deceptive trade practices."
(6) Rights of assignment.—The franchisor will usually restrict
the franchisee's right of assignment, often retaining a right of first
refusal on any bona fide offer, as well as requiring prior approval of a
prospective assignee. Provision may also be made for a sale or buy-
back in the event the franchisee dies during the agreement." The
restrictions on assignment are usually justified by the franchisor's con-
tinuing financial interest in the enterprise. Furthermore, to the extent
that the consuming public relies on the quality symbolized by the
licensed trademark, other franchisees of the same product lines need
to be protected against the possibility of an assignment of a franchise
to an unqualified franchisee.
(7) Termination.—Most franchise agreements permit the fran-
chisor to terminate the agreement if the franchisee defaults on any
payment due, or breaches any other provision of the agreement.'
Occasionally, a franchisee will be given a corresponding right in the
event of the franchisor's breach." A substantial percentage of fran-
chise contracts permits either party to terminate the relationship for
any reason after thirty days' notice;" a smaller percentage provides
a method for computing the value of the franchisee's interest in the
event the agreement is terminated."
Clearly, the specific terms of a franchise agreement determine,
3° Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1959): See
sources cited in note 8 supra.
4° Van Cise, supra note 30, at 110-12. A typical clause reads as follows:
This Agreement is personal to Licensee and none of Licensee's interest herein nor
rights hereunder may be transferred, conveyed or assigned by Licensee whether
by operation of law or otherwise ; provided that if Licensee shall at any time
desire to sell Licensee's Vehicle Renting Business, Licensee may, with the prior
written consent of Hertz, assign to the purchaser of such Vehicle Renting Business
all of the interest of Licensee in and under this Agreement. Hertz expressly agrees
that it will not unreasonably withhold such consent.
Lewis and Hancock, 1965 Hearings, supra note 3, at 349.
41 See "Dealer Lease" between Shell Oil . Co. and R.A. Davies, 11 9, 1967 Hearings,
supra note 1, at 61.
42 Van Cise, supra note 30, at 113. The author notes, however, that the franchisee is
often required to obtain a substitute franchisee or to covenant not to reenter a comparable
business during a reasonable period of time._
43 See Midas, Inc. Franchise 5(a), Lewis and Hancock, 1965 Hearings, supra note 3,
at 405.
44 See Snap-On Tools Corp. Dealer Agreement ¶ 10-13, Lewis and Hancock, 1965
Hearings, supra note 3, at 458-59.
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to a large extent, the degree of control imposed by the franchisor and
the amount of investment required of the franchisee. As the contract
terms and financial arrangements vary according to the unique re-
quirements of different franchise programs, so does the power rela-
tionship between the franchisor and the franchisee. Given the infinite
variations possible on the theme of multiple-level distribution devices,
it is not surprising that commentators have found it difficult to place
franchising on the spectrum of traditional market relationships—to
distinguish it from the ordinary vendor-vendee relationship at the one
end, and the employer-employee relationship at the other."
The difficulty of classifying franchise relationships is well illus-
trated by the fast-food industry. This industry has combined tradi-
tional methods of doing business into a unique pattern that cannot
adequately be described by traditional terminology. Although there
is mutual investment of capital and joint responsibility for the opera-
tion of the outlet, the franchisor and franchisee are not technically
"joint venturers";" nor is the franchisee merely an exclusive dis-
tributor of the franchisor-seller, since the' franchisor distributes a way
of doing business as much as he does a 'product." Neither is the
franchisee simply a trademark licensee—although the licensing of a
trademark is an important feature of franchising in the fast-food
industry—since the franchisor is involved in the enterprise to an
extent greater than is necessary to police the use of his trademark."
Given the sometimes substantial financial investment of the franchisee,
and his own employment of employees, the relationship is not quite
that of employer-employee." Thus, while a franchise arrangement
45 See note 1, supra.
40 The joint venture connotes a "more equal" partnership than that created by the
usual franchise agreement. In some situations the franchisee might bring sufficient capital
and expertise to the business to justify viewing him as a joint venturer. However, the
franchisee usually does not bring a proven competency, but rather, a capacity for learning
which is utilized by the franchisor.
47 "The sound franchisor grants a franchisee contractually limited use of a proven
trademark, good will and know-how, including use of trade secrets and copyrights, access
to a pre-sold market developed by him for an established business, product and/or service,
system-wide promotion, proven standardized operating procedures, product and service
research and mass purchasing power." Fels, supra note 4, at 4.
48 The Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq. (1970), provides for cancellation of a
trademark if the owner abandons it. "Abandoned" is defined to include any act or omis-
sion by the registrant which Causes the trademark to lose its significance as an indication
of origin. 15 U.S.C. § 1127(b) (1970). Although { 1055 of the Act protects use of the trade-
mark by "related companies," which would certainly include franchisees, see Turner v.
HMH Publishing Co., Inc., 380 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1006
(1967), the statute provides that the registration may be cancelled if the owner fails to
police the use of his mark. 15 U,S,C. § 1064(e) (1970). See Dawn Donut Co., Inc. v.
Hart's Food Stores Inc., 267 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1959). It is certainly not necessary, how-
ever, to maintain the close supervision and economic control characteristic of franchisors'
relationships with franchisees in order to protect a trademark.
40 See generally, Part H, infra.
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may be similar to one or more traditional business associations, neither
its eclectic nature nor its economic imperatives can be accurately
described by traditional concepts.
Nonetheless, since many franchisees are so closely controlled by
their dominant franchisors that the relationship strongly resembles
the traditional employment relationship, it is not surprising that the
franchisees who bear the strongest resemblance to the conventional
employee—the single distributors—are often the subject of union
organizational drives. Even where franchisees invest a significant
amount of capital and employ large numbers of employees—for ex-
ample, in fast-food outlets, car rental agencies, bottling plants or
personnel agencies--the contractual lines of control held by the fran-
chisor are often so taut that it is difficult to distinguish the franchisee
from an employee-supervisor; or, assuming he is not a supervisor, to
account for the franchisor's very active management role. Because.
franchising permits almost as much control as does the employment
relationship, employers often adopt franchising in order to retain the
advantages but to escape the obligations of an employment relation-
ship. Thus, the inherent characteristics of the franchise arrangement
which account for its appeal as a method of distribution are also the
sources of labor law issues.
The threshold question, which will be discussed in Part II, is
whether, and in what way, the National Labor Relations Board will
assert jurisdiction" over the parties to the franchise agreement. The
answer to that question will depend upon how the Board characterizes
the relationship between the franchisor, the franchisee and, where
applicable, the franchisee's employees. The Board has available a
number of options, depending upon its interpretation of the franchise
agreement: 1) where the issue involves a single distributor franchisee,
the franchisee may be defined either as an independent contractor-
50 "jurisdiction" is used here in the sense of the Board's statutory authority to subject
one or all of the parties involved in a particular franehis. to the substantive provisions of
the Act—i.e., to permit certain persons defined as "employees" to vote in a Board super-
vised representation election, or to issue a complaint alleging an unfair labor practice
against a person defined as an employer. The power involved would be analogous to the
"in personam" jurisdiction of a state or federal court.
The Board's jurisdiction may also be defined in terms of the limitations placed on its
power by its enabling legislation, the commerce clause of the United States Constitution.
The Board can only assert power over persons or disputes involved in interstate commerce.
Finally, the Board's jurisdiction may be viewed in terms of its "monetary jurisdiction"
—the self-imposed limitations on its "commerce power" which require that different
classes of enterprises satisfy different "jurisdictional yardsticks" before the Board will
assert power over them. See A. Cox and D. Bok, Cases and Materials on Labor Law
1167-68 (7th ed. 1969) for a summary statement of the "yardsticks."
When used in this article, the term "jurisdiction" will ordinarily refer to the "in
personam" jurisdiction of the Board as described above. The term "monetary jurisdiction"
will be used to describe the limitations imposed by the jurisdictional yardsticks.
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thus defeating the Board's jurisdiction—or as an employee of the
franchisor; 2) where the issue involves a franchisee who employes
additional personnel, he may be characterized as a supervisory-
employee of the franchisor, a joint employer with the franchisor, or
an independent contractor.
The "option" selected by the Board—that is, the manner in
which it characterizes the relationship of the parties to the franchise
agreement in the course of its jurisdictional determination—will, to a
great extent, determine the resolution of various substantive labor
issues relevant to the franchise association. The significant implica-
tions of the Board's jurisdictional determinations will be discussed in
Part III.
II. APPLICABILITY OF THE NLRA TO THE FRANCHISE
ARRANGEMENT
A. Jurisdiction of the NLRB: General Considerations
In the preamble to the National Labor Relations Act," Congress
observed that "[t]he denial by some employers of the right of em-
ployees to organize and the refusal by some employers to accept the
procedure of collective bargaining" had led to industrial strife." In
addition, Congress found that "[t]he inequality of bargaining power
between employees who do not possess full freedom of association or
actual liberty of contract, and employers who are organized in the
corporate or other forms of ownership association" had depressed
wage rates and prevented "the stabilization of competitive wage rates
. . . within and between industries.' To eliminate these obstructions
to commerce, Congress declared a national policy in favor of collec-
tive bargaining by protecting the workers' rights to self-organization
and collective bargaining through representatives of their own
choosing."
Although the political and economic objectives of the Act are
impressively broad, the powers of the National Labor Relations
Board are limited. The substantive terms of the Act grant the Board
both the jurisdiction to determine representation questions involving
the claim of a labor organization that it represents a majority of the
employees of an employer, and the power to adjudicate and remedy
unfair labor practice charges against employers or the representatives
of employees." The Board's jurisdiction, therefore, encompasses, and
51 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. (1970).
112 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970).
53
 29 U,S.C. § 151 (1970).
54 29 U.S.C. §§ 151, 157 (1970).
55 The Board's juiisdiction over representation questions is conferred by § 9(c) (1),
which authorizes the Board to investigate representation petitions, provides for appropriate
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is limited to, problems emanating from the employment relationship.
Interestingly enough, the Act does not comprehensively define either
"employer" or "employee." Section 2 indicates that agents of em-
ployers are employers, and that certain classes of employers are to be
excluded from the Act; " but the meaning of "employer" is assumed.
In defining "employee," the NLRA carefully preserves the status of
"employee" for individuals who have ceased work in connection with
a labor dispute, but excludes certain classes of employees, as well as
independent contractors, from the definition." This inclusion-exclu-
sion description, however, assumes agreement on the meaning of the
term "employee."
Faced with congressional silence as to the precise meaning of
these important terms, the Board early referred to a variety of
sources, including common law agency principles, for definitions of the
terms "employer" and "employee!" 68 The common law speaks in
terms of master-servant and independent contractor rather than in
terms of employer-employee. The master-servant relationship has long
been considered analogous to the employer-employee relation-
ship; but whether an independent contractor should be considered an
employee under the Act was problematic." A servant, in common law
parlance, is an agent "whose physical conduct in the performance of
[services for which he is employed] is controlled or is subject to the
bearings and "direct[s] an election by secret ballot . . ." 29 U.S.C.
	 159(c) (1) (1970).
Jurisdiction over unfair labor practices, defined by section 8, 29 U.S.C. A 158- (1970), is
conferred by section 10, which authorizes the Board to prevent unfair labor practices
by investigating charges, issuing complaints, holding hearings, enjoining proscribed con-
duct and enforcing orders in federal courts of appeal. 29 U.S.C. 160 (1970).
58 29 U.S.C. 4 152(2) (1970).
57
 29 U.S.C. 4 152(3) ( 1 970).
58
 The Board used the common law test as one source, see Seattle Post-Intelligencer,
Dept. of Hearst Pub., Inc., 9 N.L.R.B. No. 119, 3 L.R.R.M. 386 (1938), but did not con-
sider itself bound by common Iaw concepts of the employment relationship; see United
Dredging Co., 30 N.L.R.B. No. 118, 8 L.R.R.M. 83 (1941), and defined the statutory
term "employee" as including all employees in a legal and conventional sense, unless
specifically excluded; see The Park Floral Co., 19 N.L.R.B. No. 44, 5 L.R.R.M. 514, 515
(1940). However, in most of the early cases, the Board relied on the "right to control"
test. See, e.g., James B. Stark Co., 33 N.L.R.B., No. 186, 8 L.R.R.M. 315 (1941); Long
Lake Lumber Co., 34 N.L.R.B. 700, 9 L.R.R.M. 28 (1941); S.H. Kress & Co., 34
N.L.R.B. 1152, 9 L.R.R.M. 65 (1941). On the basis of this test, the Board often found
that the alleged employees were independent contractors. See Red River Lumber Co.,
5 N.L.RB. 663, 2 L.R.R.M. 29 (1938); Theurer Wagon Works, Inc., 18 N.L.R.B. No.
97, 5 L.R.R.M. 450 (1939).
69 The problems involved in tracing the outer limits of the employment relationship
have arisen in the determination of the applicability of modern social legislation. For
example, the Restatement of Agency states: "In all of these acts [Labor Relation Act,
Social Security Act, Unemployment Insurance Act, Minimum Wage Act and Fair Labor
Practice Act] the terms employer and employee normally refer to the persons dealt with
in the Restatement of this Subject under the heading of master and servant." Restatement
of AgencT2d at 3 (1957).
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right to control by the master." An independent contractor is one
over whom the only control reserved is control of the result sought."
The Board indicated in its early decisions that, in applying
the common law formula to an individual case, it would look to the
"purpose of the Ace" to determine whether certain individuals were
members of a group requiring the protection of the Act. In Hearst
Publications, Inc.," the Board stated that "the primary consideration
in the determination of the applicability of the statutory definition
[of employee] is whether effectuation ... of the Act comprehend [s]
securing to the individual the rights guaranteed and protection afforded
by the Act."" The Supreme Court approved and elaborated upon the
Board's definitional approach in NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc."
Justice Rutledge articulated a well-reasoned rationale for the Board's
decision in that case:
The mischief at which the Act is aimed and the remedies
it offers are not confined exclusively to "employees" within
the traditional legal distinctions separating them from "in-
dependent contractors." . . . [T]he broad language of the
Act's definitions, which in terms reject conventional limita-
tions on such conceptions as "employee," "employer," and
"labor disputes," leaves no doubt that its applicability is to
be determined broadly . . . by underlying economic facts
rather than technically and exclusively by previously estab-
lished legal classifications."'
Congress reacted adversely to the Court's declared independence
from common law criteria and amended the definition of "employee"
specifically to exclude independent contractors."' It is clear from the
congressional history explaining the amendment that the primary
purpose of the exclusion was to restrict the Board to the common law
agency definition of "employee."" A second purpose, inferable from
congressional displeasure with the Board's specific decision in Hearst,
was to indicate that individuals having the characteristics of "Hearst
news vendors" should be defined as independent contractors.'" Al-
'° Id. at 12.
61
 See Veta Mines, Inc., 36 N.L.R.B. No. 52, 9 L.R.R.M. 151 (1941).
02 28 N.L.R.B. No. 151, 7 L.R.R.M. 163 (1941).
ea Id., 7 L.R.R.M. at 164.
64 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
66
 322 U.S. at 126, 129.
66
 Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, Pub. L. No. 101, § 101-2(3), 61 Stat.
137-38, amending 29 U.S.C. 'I 152 (1946) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq. (1970)).
61
 H.R. Conference Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. reported in U.S. Code Cong.
Serv. 1137-38 (1947) ; 93 Cong. Rec. 6441-42 (1947) (remarks of Senator Taft).
08
 The problem of the status of the Hearst newsboys has never been solved to the
satisfaction of the Hearst chain. See San Antonio Light Div., The Hearst Corp., 167
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though the amendatory language did 'not necessarily foreclose the
Board's use of the "mischief-remedy" test announced in Hearst,
NLRB decisions subsequent to the Taft-Hartley Act apparently have
deferred to the clear purpose of the Amendment. In cases raising the
issue, the Board has announced somewhat repetitiously, and always
in the same language, that the employer-employee status is deter-
mined by reference to the common law master-servant test."
B. The Franchisee as Employee: Single Distributors
Within the context of franchising, the status of the parties to a
franchise agreement may be determined in either a representation or
an unfair labor practice proceeding. In the larger franchise enterprises,
the definitional problem usually lies in determining whether the fran-
chisor is unrelated to the franchisee's employees, or whether he is a
joint employer of them. In smaller franchise operations such as the
single distributor enterprise, the question is whether the franchisee is
an independent contractor or an employee of the franchisor. The
Board's use of the "right to control" test to characterize the franchise
relationship is well illustrated in Mister Softee of Indiana," a fairly
typical single distributor case.
In Mister So/tee, a union filed a representation petition seeking
an election among single driver-salesmen (but excluding multiple
owner drivers) who distributed soft ice cream under franchise agree-
ments with the alleged employer. Under the agreement the franchisee
purchased a truck from the franchisor for use within an exclusive
territory, the boundaries of which were unilaterally determined by
the franchisor. The franchisor apparently licensed the franchisee to
use the trademark "Mister Softee," and also agreed to supply him
with the "Mister Softee" mix. In return, the franchisee agreed to de-
vote his full time to the conduct of the business between April 31. and
October 1; no specific hours were required. The franchisee was re-
quired to purchase 2500 gallons of the franchisor's mix each year at
a predetermined price and to buy other unspecified products through
the franchisor. The franchisee could charge whatever price he wished
N.L.R.B. No. 99, 66 L.R.R.M. 1131 (1967), and 174 N.L.R.B. No. 97, 70 L.R.R.M. 1252
(1969), where the Board rejected the employer's claim that the vendors were independent
contractors. Although the Board has allegedly abandoned the "mischief-remedy" test of
Justice Rutledge in favor of the common law "right to control" test;most newsboys arc
still adjudged employees on the grounds that "Where is no room for the exercise of true
discretion in the performance of the [deliverer's] work." See Newsjournal Co.; 180
N.L.R.B. No. 137, 73 L.R.R.M. 1166, 1169 (1970).
89 See, e.g., Borden, Inc., 181 N.L.R.B. No. 19, 73 L.R.R.M. 1583 (1970). BUt cf. A.
Paladini, Inc., 168 N.L.R.B. No. 132, 67 L.R.R.M. 1022, 1023 (1967), where the Board
cautioned against a "mechanical application of the right to control test."'
. TO 162 N.L.R.B.-No. 22, 64 L.R.R.M. 103411966). . 	 - .
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at retail, but the agreement fixed the wholesale price of the mix. Al-
though the agreement did not cover the point, the franchisees were
free to hire their own helpers. The franchisor specifically required
that the franchisee "maintain and operate his truck in strict con-
formance with the plans, procedures, policies, and promotional direc-
tives prescribed by the [parent franchisor]."" Finally, the franchisee
had to obtain the consent of the franchisor before he could assign his
franchise interest.'
The franchisor moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that
the drivers were not his employees but were independent contractors,
excluded by Section 2 (2) from the scope of the National Labor Re-
lations Act. In response to the franchisor's motion the Board stated
that:
[I]n determining the status of persons alleged to be
independent contractors the Act requires application of the
"right to control" test. Where the person for whom the ser-
vices are performed retains the right to control the manner
and means by which the result is to be accomplished, the
relationship is one of employment; on the other hand, where
control is reserved only as to the result sought, the relation-
ship is that of an independent contractor. The resolution of
this question depends on the facts of each case, and no one
factor is determinative."
The Board analyzed the franchise arrangement, including the
contractual instrument, using the right to control test. After first
noting the presence of several factors usually indicative of the vendor-
independent contractor relationship—for example, the drivers' owner-
ship of their trucks, their use of employees, and the employer's failure
to make the usual payroll deductions—the Board found that the
franchisees were employees of the franchisor.'" To support this con-
clusion, the Board cited franchisor control of the size of franchisee
territories and the prices and sources of franchisee supplies; the fran-
chisor's right to require operation of the trucks according to uni-
laterally imposed policies; the restriction on the franchisee's right of
assignment; and the fact that all controls and restrictions were en-
forceable by the franchisor's right to terminate the operation.'' Since
the salient features of the relationship between Mister Sof tee and its
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id., 64 L.R.R.M. at 1035.
74 Id.
75 Id.
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drivers are fairly common in franchise arrangements," the extent to
which the elements of this situation indicate an employment relation-
ship suggests whether subjecting this type of franchise arrangement to
the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board is proper.
Franchisors of single distributors invariably insist on controlling
the location and size of the franchisee's route or territory. While the
route establishes the boundaries of the franchisee's activities, in no
way does it determine the manner in which the activity must be
carried out. If a purchaser is characterized as an employer merely
because he stipulates the scope of the work to be performed, a home-
owner who hires a painter to paint his house, but not his garage, or
who directs a carpenter to add one room but not two, would become,
according to the Board's right to control test, an employer of the
painter and carpenter. Such an interpretation suggests misunderstand-
ing of Agency law. The "controls" which determine the work relation-
ship are not the spatial limitations on the area in which work is to be
done, but the job specifications which prescribe the manner of per-
formance.
As further evidence of the franchisor's right to control, the
Board pointed to the restrictions on the franchisee's right to assign
his franchise interest." Although restrictions on assignment may re-
flect an unconscionable exercise of raw economic power, a covenant
restricting alienability hardly gives the franchisor the right to control
the "means of accomplishing the result" for which the franchisee is
responsible.
The Board in Mister Softee also cited, as proof of the employer's
right to control, contract terms which fixed the price of the mix, im-
76
 The type of "franchise" relationship created in Mister So/tee has been duplicated
in numerous N.L.R.B. cases. In Frito-Lay, Inc., 178 N.L.R.B. No. 92, 72 L.R.R.M. 1177
(1969), for example, a national manufacturer and wholesaler of snack foods franchised
individual sales routes to service retail outlets within geographically determined sales
districts. Initially hired as employees for a two week training period, the franchisees were
eventually assigned a route created unilaterally by the franchisor. They purchased and
provided their own trucks as well as the necessary gas, oil, maintenance and repairs. If
necessary, franchisees hired their own help, established their own hours and daily schedules,
and the time and duration of their vacations. Franchisees were free to sell other products
to their customers, provided they satisfactorily serviced customers purchasing the fran-
chisor's products. The franchisees received a commission on sales of 15-20 percent—the
difference between the price charged them for the merchandise and the "store-door" price—
also set by the franchisor.
In a representation proceeding, the Board held that, despite the drivers' ownership
of their trucks and the limited discretion allowed them in servicing their routes, a master-
servant relationship was evidenced by the franchisor's control of the location and size
of routes, the sales practices of the franchisees, the prices charged for the products, the
billing and credit accounts, the assistance rendered the franchisees by the franchisor in
soliciting and servicing accounts, and the minimal proprietary interest the franchisees
had in their routes.
77 Mister Softee of Indiana, 162 N.L.R.B. No. 22, 64 L.R.R.M. 1034 (1966).
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posed a gallonage requirement and designated dairies from which the
franchisees were to buy the mix." It is difficult to understand why
the Board cited the franchisor's power to fix the price of the mix as
evidence of his right to control performance; a franchisor fixes such
a price in the same way that sellers of any product fix the price of
their product. The gallonage requirement and the exclusive list of mix
suppliers, however, are related to the issue of the employer's right to
control the means used by the franchisee. Similarly, the franchisor's
right to require operation of the trucks in conformance with policies
of the franchisor, while necessary to protect the value of the trade-
mark and the financial investment of the franchisor, is persuasive
evidence that the franchisor is directing, or has the power to direct,
the physical activities of the franchisee.
As franchisors have noted in other contexts, however, the task of
the franchisee is not merely the sale of the franchisor's products to the
public; it is the implementation of a complete system for the success-
ful marketing of the franchisor's products or service." According to
this theory, the Board has invariably confused the means used to
accomplish the result with the result itself. Many franchisors rely on
secret processes, patented machines or recognizable service patterns
to create a factor of good will in the franchise package. Each fran-
chisee is dependent upon the franchisor not only for the trademark,
and for patent and management advice, but also for protection against
deviations, by other franchisees, from the standards of quality and
service necessary to preserve good will." When viewed as constituent
elements of a total "system" of marketing, rather than as badges of
franchisor dominance, these controls, which the Board considers in-
dicative of the master-servant relationship, more accurately evidence
the interdependence of a franchisor and his franchisees in creating
and maintaining a viable enterprise.n
The argument is certainly imaginative and even plausible in
terms of the realities of American business patterns. Given the imagi-
native flexibility of the business community, it is now quite apparent
78
 Id., 64 L.R.R.M. at 1035.
7° Fels, Franchising: Legal Problems and the Business Framework of Reference—An
Overview, in The Franchising Sourcebook 1-9 (J. McCord ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited
as Fels].
80
 "Without controls to the extent reasonably required to assure a maintenance of
uniform standards of the product-service-mix as well as of [sic] the quality of it, the value
and reputation of the trademark and the entire system might 'evaporate' because of re-
peated frustration of reasonable consumer expectations." Id. at 16.
81 "Many of franchising's legal problems are peculiarly 'franchising' problems because,
inherent in them, are the controls commonly employed by the system; and because the
resolution.
 of the problems with system survival will require acceptance of franchising for
what is—sui generis—a separate modern business form used by mutually interdependent
businessmen bound in a contractual continuing relationship." Id. at 19.
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that the old categories of business associations, and the distinctions
between them, are often purely legal: the corporate form, once a
symbol for aggregates of capital, is now used .by corner grocery
stores; the partnership form, generally associated with small trades-
men, is often used by giant oil companies. An employee salesman may
have more freedom in scheduling his work day and in negotiating
with customers than does an independent retail clothing store which
sells the lines of a few large manufacturers. Similarly, the master-
servant—independent contractor distinction is an anachronism.
Images of independent, medieval guild craftsmen and memories of
self-reliant Yankee store-keepers are conjured up when the Board
speaks—as it recently did—of the independent contractor not only
as a person free from close control by his principal but also as a per-
son who has the "opportunity to make decisions which will affect his
profit and loss." 82
 The degree of freedom which the employee or the
"independent" businessman enjoys in making managerial decisions
more often reflects the nature of the enterprise than the status of the
individual. As franchisors have long realized, and franchisees have
learned, the freedom to make managerial decisions is frequently
nothing more than the freedom to fail. 82
It would be idle to generalize about the various types of re-
straints under which retail dealers operate." Few retailers fit the
82 A. Paladini, Inc., 168 N.L.R.B. No. 132, 67 L.R.R.M. 1022, 1023 (1967).
8a According to Robert Rosenberg, President of Dunkin' Dounts of America, Inc.:
In today's highly sophisticated business society, one out of every two independent
businesses started each year fail. Out of every 10 new independent restaurants
that open their doors for business today, 5 will close within 1 year and 8 out of
the 10 will be out of business within 5 years. Compare these facts, if you will,
with a fatality rate of just under 5 percent for businessmen operating under a
franchise banner.
Hearings on S. 2507 and S. 2321 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., at 177 (1967).
84
 For an excellent survey of the myriad restraints under which retail businessmen
operate, see S. Hollander, Restraints Upon Retail Competition (Marketing and Trans-
portation Paper No. 14, Bureau of Business and Economic Research, Graduate School
of Business Administration, Michigan State Univ., 1965). The author, while acknowledging
that the franchise system of distribution "provides for the maximum degree of control,
short of outright ownership, id. at 20, also points out that "some aspects of ... fran-
chising . . . have contributed to the vitality and diversity of the marketing system" in
contrast to "the manufacturer-dealer arrangements in some industries [which] have made
the retailers captives to their suppliers' price policies and distribution practices." Id. at 2.
In speaking of suppliers' restraints, the author notes that:
To a great extent, the supplier's influence will vary with the retailer's need for his
wares and the supplier's need for specific types of behavior at the retail level.
The strength of the consumer demand for the manufacturer's or wholesaler's
brand, and the importance of his products in the retailer's sales and profit mix
will often determine how much direction the supplier can exert. Similarly, the
degree. to which retail salesmanship, demonstration, or service is required will
often determine the controls the supplier wants to exert. . . . If the supplier's
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purist model used by the Board to measure the "independent busi-
nessman." Some retailers have a greater degree of freedom to make
decisions "affecting profit and loss," but since many employees enjoy
the same freedom, often to a greater extent than traditional inde-
pendent retailers, the test is an ineffective method of distinguishing
them. If the Board is to be responsive to contemporary marketing
realities, it might better search for identifying characteristics of the
independent contractor in terms of the actual objectives sought by the
small businessman-franchisee rather than relying entirely on the
freedom from control requirement of Agency law. Franchisees seek
primarily a property interest which' will make them independent of
the wage system. The difference between the employee and the small
independent businessman lies in the equity investment of the latter
and in his ability to redeem and perhaps reap a profit on the invest-
ment.
According to this approach, the franchisee who invests a significant
amount of money in the enterprise, and who retains the right to sell
or recoup his investment, would be defined as an independent con-
tractor, despite the usual tight lines of control tying him to the fran-
chisor. Conversely, the allegedly independent franchisee having no
investment and a minimal proprietary interest would be viewed as an
employee, despite the absence of contractual controls in the franchise
agreement. "Investments" consisting of the purchase of a delivery
truck or inventory financed by the franchisor through long-term
credit would be viewed critically by the Board. In order to acquire
a property interest setting him off from the traditional employee, the
franchisee should have a substantial financial interest in the enter-
prise, which can be transferred or assigned. In addition, the fran-
chisee's interest should be acknowledged in the agreement. Where
the franchisor has the right to terminate that interest at his discretion
on thirty days' notice, the value of the franchisee's proprietary in-
terest should be discounted accordingly.
In terms of the "ownership test" the distributors in Mister Softec
were obviously employees: their investment consisted of an obligation
to pay off the cost of the trucks; their proprietary interest in the
enterprise was nonexistent. Franchisors in this type of case will find
it difficult to convince the Board that their franchisees are independent
contractors in the sense of our definition. This difficulty, however, is,
not artificially created by legal constructs; rather, it is a reflection of
market realities. •
offerings cover most or all of the dealer's line, the degree of supervision may be
almost as great as under outright ownership,
Id. at 19.
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Perhaps the suggested approach to the problem of distinguishing
the employee from the independent contractor does not appear to
adhere to the definitional mandate of Congress. However, the number
of factors used to analyze the employment relationship under common
law permits such flexibility that the Board has, in fact if not in theory,
been given carte blanche to sort out the employee-independent con-
tractor conundrum." It is not suggested that the Board should distort
prior formulations of the common law test; rather, the point is that
the Board should make the test more realistic and useful by looking
to the proprietary interest retained by the franchisee.
There is evidence that the Board has been influenced by the argu-
ments of franchisors and the economic facts of modern franchising
although it has apparently felt constrained to phrase these influ-
ences in terms of the right to control test. In A. Paladini, Inc.," the
captains of fleet-owned fishing boats had the kind of discretion which
the Board has determined essential for a finding of independent con-
tractor status. They selected their own crews, determined the wages
to be paid, personally selected appropriate fishing spots, and negotiated
the price which the company would pay for the catch. The captains
obviously had the right to make decisions affecting their profit and
losses. Nonetheless, the Board found that the captains were employee-
supervisors rather than independent contractors. In reaching this
decision, the Board cautioned against a "mechanical application of
the right to control test" and indicated that the test must be applied
"in light of the economic realities of the particular situation!" B7 Al-
though the Board stated that one of the factors to consider was the
opportunity to make decisions affecting profit and loss, the Board
seemed to have been more influenced by the fact that the captains had
made no financial investment (the company owned the boats and
equipment) and had assumed no financial risks."
While the Board has apparently taken a step in the right direction
with its sub-silentio modification of the common law test, Chairman
Miller has argued for a return to the "mechanical" test in his dissents
to several recent decisions." It is still unclear whether the courts of
appeal will accept this new approach. For example, in Carnation Co.,"
the company began negotiating individual distributorship agreements
88 The Board has attempted to make the right to control test a more realistic
measure of employment status through use of the "opportunities to affect profit and loss"
test and through its willingness to consider indirect and subtle controls over the franchisee.
86 168 N.L.R.B. No. 132, 67 L.R.R.M. 1022 (1967).
87 Id., 67 L.R.R.M. at 1023.
88 Id.
88 See Farmers Insurance Group, 187 N.L.R.B. No. 123, 76 L.R.R.M. 1133, 1138-39
(1971) ; Deaton, Inc., 187 N.L.R.B. No. 102, 76 L.R.R.M. 1129, 1131-33 (1971).
90 -172 N.L.R.B. No. 215, 69 L.R.R.M. 1127 (1968).
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with its employee-drivers at a time when the drivers were represented
by a union. Under the proposed franchise arrangement, the drivers
were to purchase their trucks and equipment from Carnation under
conditional sales contracts, payable in monthly installments. To secure
these contracts, each distributor was required to assign his accounts
.receivable to Carnation and to execute a trust agreement which estab-
lished a joint bank account. All proceeds were to be deposited in the
joint bank account, from which funds could be withdrawn only over
the joint signatures of the distributor and a Carnation representative.'
Carnation forbade the sale of competitive products, required the dis-
tributor to maintain company-installed advertising at his own expense,
indicated how the truck was to be painted, provided for cancellation
by either party on thirty days' notice, and allowed cancellation by
Carnation on one day's notice if the distributor breached the agree-
ment. In the event Carnation terminated for breach by the distributor,
it would acquire title to any of the distributor's trucks upon which
a balance was owing without having to account for the distributor's
equity." The distributors were free to set their own hours of work
and sequence of deliveries and to wear their own clothes. They were
required to pay their own license fees and taxes, to obtain health and
liability insurance at their own expense, and to buy their own gasoline
and garage services."
In response to union charges I that the company had violated
Sections 8(a) (1) and 8(a) (5) of the NLRA, the Board found that,
despite the franchise agreement signed by approximately one-third of
the drivers, the latter were still employees under the Act. Accordingly,
the Board set aside the franchise agreement. The Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals denied enforcement of the Board's order and held that the
driver-distributors had been effectively transformed into independent
contractors." Without inquiring into the number of ways there are
to deliver milk, the court concluded that except for the economic
controls, "found in a variety of 'franchise' arrangements oriented
toward brand-name protection and market penetration," Carnation
made no attempt to control the way its drivers carried out their
deliveries."
The court apparently saw a significant difference between the
employees' former status as employee-drivers and their later status as
franchisees. In fact, however, the p9ssibility of greater profit is offset
by the franchisees' obligation to pay for their trucks, insurance, gas,
91 Id., 69 L.R.R.M. at 1128.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Carnation Co. v. NLRB, 429 F.2d 1130 (9th Cir. 1970).
95 Id. at 1134.
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oil, repairs and advertising maintenance. Furthermore, . they have
neither a proprietary interest in the route nor,. initially, an investment
in the enterprise. Yet, as .a result of the court's decision," they no
longer enjoy the benefits of union representation or the various pro-
tections of the National Labor Relations Act. This decision clearly
conflicts with the result that would have been reached using the
"ownership" test. It is arguable that the "franchisees" are now less
"independent" than they had been under the collective bargaining
agreement. Such a result demands a closer examination of investment
f actors.
C. The Franchisee as Employer: Multidistributors
The discussion has thus far focused upon the franchisee as an
employee, as typified by the single distributor. Often, however, a fran-
chisee will hire a significant number of employees to assist him in
running a large scale enterprise. The problems of characterizing the
96
 Id. Appellate courts have responded in much the same way to similar decisions by
the Board. In Meyer Dairy, Inc. v. NLRB, 429 F.2d 697 (10th Cir. 1970), the NLRB
characterized the members of the Meyer Dairy Distributors Association as employees of
Meyer Dairy, rejecting the employer's contention that the distributors were independent
contractors, and ordered a representation election in which the union received a majority
of the ballots cast. The employer refused to bargain and was found in violation of
§ 8(a) (5) by the Board. The court of appeals refused to enforce the Board's order on
the ground that the Board was erroneous in finding that the milkmen were employees.
The Board had examined the contractual and de facto relationship between the
distributors and the Dairy, and had found that the allegedly independent contractors
owned no proprietary interest, operated under oral leases and were subject to the close
supervision of the employer. In addition, the Board noted that the employer furnished
the franchised distributor with company-bought trucks and parts, and provided for
repair work in a company-owned garage. The contract stated that the distributors had
to "meet the standards as established by the [company] . consistent with standards of
. . . individuals engaged in similar dairy products business in [certain] particulars." There
followed six specific areas in which the franchisee was required to conform his work
practices to requirements of the franchisor. Id. at 702.
However, upon review, the court found that there were no elements of agency present.
Apparently, the court meant that it found no elements of a master-servant relationship,
since the distributors, even if independent contractors, were certainly agents of the
company. The court went on to conclude that the distributors were "holders of fran-
chises .. . free from business control of Meyer except that they are required to meet
[certain] standards . . ." Id.
Such a reaction by appellate courts may be explained, in part, by the Board's
vacillation in the driver-distributor cases. Although theoretically applying the same right
of control test, the Board consistently found, during the 1950's, that driver-distributors
were independent contractors. See, e.g., Shamrock Dairy, Inc., 124 N.L.R.B. No. 63, 44
L.R.R.M. 1407 (1959), and 119 N.L.R.B. No. 134, 41 L.R.R.M. 1216 (1957) aff'd sub.
nom. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local Union No. 310 v. NLRB, 280 F.2d
665 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied 364 U.S. 892 (1960); and Pure Seal Dairy Co., 135 N.L.R.B.
No. 12, 49 L.R.R.M. 1434 (1962). During the era of the Kennedy-Johnson Board, the
NLRB, without explicitly overruling its prior decisions, generally found that driver-
distributors, operating pursuant to franchise arrangements little different from the
arrangements of Shamrock Dairy or Pure Seal, were employees.
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three party relationship (franchisor-franchisee-franchisee's employees)
in determining the jurisdictional question are somewhat more com-
plex than those encountered in the single distributor context. In addi-
tion to characterizing the franchise arrangement in terms of statutory
formulae already discussed, the NLRB must define the interrelation-
ships among the three interest groups. Using the right to control test
as the guiding principle, the Board has at various times determined
franchisees to be (1) independent contractor-employers, {2) joint
employers with the franchisor, (3) employees of the franchisor, or
(4) supervisory employees of the franchisor.
The jurisdictional issue in controversies involving franchisee-
employers may arise as a result of union attempts to organize either
the franchisees or the franchisees' employees. In either case, the
essential question is whether or not the franchisor will be characterized
as an employer of the interest group which the union seeks to repre-
sent. If the franchisee's employees are being organized, the union will
of course contend that the franchisor and the franchisee are joint
employers or that the franchisor is the employer with the franchisee
his supervisory employee; the point is to ensure that the franchisor is
included in the employment relationship. If the franchisee is the sole
employer, the enterprise will probably not satisfy the Board's minimum
jurisdiction requirements and the representation petition will be dis-
missed." If the franchisees are being organized, the union must
convince the board that the franchisees are employees, but not super-
visory employees, since the latter are not protected by the NLRA."
The franchisor would of course argue that the franchisees are inde-
pendent contractors or, if they are employees, that they are supervisory
employees. An illustrative case, Southland Corp.,'" raises most of these
issues.
In Southland, a union petitioned for an election in a unit com-
posed of employees of Speedee Mart, a franchised outlet operated by
Wallace S. George, Sr., under an agreement with the Southland Corpo-
ration. The agreement resembled the standard arrangement, with
modifications appropriate to the enterprise. After surveying prospec-
tive sites, Southland had acquired a site, constructed a store, supplied
fixtures and completely stocked the store with grocery merchandise.
Southland then franchised the "system" to George. Under the terms
of the franchise agreement, George leased the store and fixtures and
87 See text accompanying note 102 infra.
08 Under § 14(a) of the Act, a supervisor may become a member of a labor or-
ganization, but no employer subject to the Act is required "to deem . . . supervisors as
employees for the purpose of any law . . . relating to collective bargaining." 29 U.S.C.
§ 164(a) (1970).
98 170 N.L.R.B. No. 159, 67 L.R,R.M. 1582 (1968).
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obtained a license to use the "7-Eleven" trademark , and operational
system. The system consisted of a continuing provision of services,
including a bookkeeping service whereby the franchisee deposited
daily all cash sales proceeds into Southland's account. From this ac-
count, Southland paid the franchisee's bills, made out the salary
checks for George's employees and processed and paid the invoices
submitted by George's suppliers. The franchisor furnished George
with a policy manual which described in detail virtually every action
to be taken by the franchisee in the conduct of his store. South-
land also provided retail price recommendations and a list of authorized
vendors from whom George could purchase his supplies. Finally,
Southland retained the right to terminate the agreement without cause
on thirty days' notice.'"
The petitioning union averred that Southland was the employer
and George its supervisor. In the alternative, the union contended
that George and Southland were joint employers.'" Southland, on the
other hand, claimed that George was an independent contractor. The
Board evaluated these contentions in light of the control factors
present in the franchise arrangement and concluded that George was
an independent contractor and the sole employer of the store's em-
ployees. Since George's annual retail sales were less than the Board's
minimum retail jurisdictional standards, the Board dismissed the
petition.'"
In reaching this conclusion, the Board looked behind the agree-
ment and its purported reservation of a right to control in the hands
of the franchisor. 10' The Board disposed of the Southland Policy
Manual by noting that the record indicated that neither George nor
the franchisor had considered it anything more than a guide."' The
periodic price recommendations were viewed as "merely sugges-
tions," 1" and the list of authorized vendors as only recommenda-
tions."" The Board pointed out that George had set his prices above
or below the recommended schedule, and had purchased supplies from
vendors not on the approved list. Finally, the Board rejected the
union's contention that the power to cancel the franchise gave the
franchisor a "club" that could be used to achieve compliance with his
demands.'"
The Board's application of the right to control test had differed
no Id., 67 L.R.R.M at 1582-84.
101 Id., 67 L.R.R.M. at 1582.
102 Id., 67 L.R.R.M. at 1584.
103 Id., 67 L.R.R.M. at 1583-84.
104 Id., 67 L.R.R.M. at 1583.
105 Id.
100 Id., 67 L.R,R,M. at 1584.
107 Id.
240
LABOR LAW ASPECTS OF FRANCHISING
significantly in Mister Softee, where the franchisees did not employ
additional help.'" In that case, the Board emphasized the elements in
the relationship giving the franchisor the right to control, including
those required by state law, to support its finding of an employer-em-
ployee relationship. Specifically, the Board examined the franchise
agreement and pointed to the franchisor's right to inspect the fran-
chisee's truck, his control over the route size, his exclusive dealing
requirement, his unlimited right to prescribe plans, procedures and
policies, and finally, his right to terminate the agreement.'" In South-
land, on the other hand, the Board seemed to give considerable weight
to the control actually exercised by the franchisor.
While this difference in treatment appears unjustified, it comports
with the "ownership" test suggested above."° In Mister Softee the
franchisee's only investment was the cost of the truck, which he was
required to purchase and finance through the franchisor."' In South-
land the franchisee initially invested $4,000 against the inventory price
of $10,500 required by the franchisor, and at the time of the union's
petition be had a total equity of $15,000 in the store. 112 If, as has been
suggested,'" the restrictions on the manner in which the enterprise
is conducted are less important in determining employee status than
the power contractually retained or in fact possessed by the franchisor
to disenfranchise the franchisee, the monetary investment or accrual
of equity interest must operate as a significant check on the franchisor's
power to terminate the relationship. Under most franchise agreements,
where the franchisee not only buys the truck or fixtures and the good
will of a fixed location, but also purchases an "interest" in the entire
system as well, the franchisor is obligated to buy out the franchisee's
proprietary interest at termination. Thus, the right of Southland to
terminate arbitrarily the franchise held by George had to be dis-
counted by the cost of exercising the right—the repayment of the
$15,000 equity interest. In contrast, the franchisee in Mister Softee
apparently possessed no interest in his route other than the excess of
his truck's value over finance payments made to the franchisor. There
was no financial disadvantage to the franchisor in arbitrarily terminat-
ing the franchise.
Another factor which may have influenced the Board in its reso-
lution of the independent contractor-employee issue was the fact that
108 For a discussion of the Board's treatment of the franchise arrangements in
Mister Softee, see pp. 230-33 supra.
100
 Mister Softee of Indiana, 162 N.L.R.B. No. 22, 64 L.R.R.M. 1034, 1035 (1966).
110 See pp. 234-36 supra.
111 Mister Softee of Indiana, 162 N.L.R.B. No. 22, 64 L.R.R.M. 1034 (1966).
112 Southland Corp., 170 N.L.R,B. No. 159, 67 L.R.R.M. 1582 (1968).
118 See p. 235 supra.
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'George himself was not actively involved in manning the store, but
had delegated management responsibilities to his son, and had hired
additional help.'" Consequently, the union claimed that George was a
supervisory employee of Southland."' The implications of finding
George a supervisor are most important. In Mister So/ tee the fran-
chisees were called employees and thereby given the opportunity to
combine in bargaining with the franchisor. If George and similar fran-
chisees are defined not merely as employees, but as supervisory em-
ployees, they lose the possible advantages of employer status, without
obtaining the off-setting benefits of employee rights. More specifically,
their bargaining position vis-a-vis the franchisor is weakened and their
power over their "employees" is diluted. Yet, since supervisors are
specifically excluded from provisions of the NLRA, such a finding
would award no compensatory protection to the franchisees. Thus, to
define George as a supervisory employee would have been an unde-
sirable solution to the problem.
However, the union suggested another conceptualization of the re-
lationship which would have better served the objectives of the NLRA
—that George and Southland were joint employers of the unit em-
ployees."' The "joint employer" characterization, however, was also
rejected by the Board. The decision indicated that the critical factor
used in determining whether a joint employer relationship exists "is
the control which one party exercises over the labor relations policy of
the other. "117 Again, the test looks to the right to control, not exclu-
sively to the exercise of control, possessed under the agreement. The
Board found that Southland possessed neither actual nor potential
control over the labor relations of George with his employees. It pointed
first to the language of the franchise agreement giving George
fettered control over "any and all labor relations." In addition, since
the record disclosed no evidence that Southland had ever sought to in-
fluence George's labor relations policies, the Board found that George
was the sole employer of his employees. In response to the union's
claim that Southland indirectly controlled the number of employees,
their wages and their hours"' through Article 14 of the franchise
agreement—providing that to the extent the franchisee's payroll
exceeded eight percent of net sales, the owner's draw could be reduced
by the amount of such excesses—the Board noted that the clause did
not require George to reduce the number of hours or wages of his em-
114 Southland Corp., 170 N.L.R.B. No. 159, 67 L.R.R.M. 1582, 1583 (1968).
US Id., 67 L.R.R.M. at 1582.
116 Id.
117 Id., 67 L.R.R.M. at 1584.
118 Id,
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ployees.'" The Board added that the effect of the clause on George's
labor policies, assuming causal connection, was too remote and con-
jectural to be considered in determining possible control by Southland.
The Board accurately articulated the joint employer rule, but
applied it too narrowly. The conceptual justification for the rule
derives from the nature' of collective bargaining. The original purpose
of the NLRA was to encourage organization of employees so as to
permit meaningful negotiations between the employer and his em-
ployees—that is, between the person who determines the allocation of
the enterprise's resources and profits and the persons whose wages,
hours and conditions of employment are affected by the allocation. At
the very least, collective bargaining requires that the union actually
represent the desires and needs of employees and that management
represent the power that determines the lot of the employees.'" If
George's employees are limited to bargaining with George, they will
not be bargaining with the ultimate, source of power over their wages
and conditions of employment.
The presence of direct controls is important in analyzing South-
land's control, but their absence is not conclusive proof of the fran-
chisee's independence. In Southland, for example, the franchisor exer-
cised considerable control over financial policies of the franchisee.
Southland unilaterally established the inventory price and determined
the amount of the down-payment. The balance was to be paid by the
franchisee from the amount remaining after the franchisor deducted his
fifty-five percent share of adjusted gross sales. The franchisee could
"draw" only part of his share of the sale proceeds, the remainder being
applied to reduction of his debt with Southland. If his payroll costs
exceeded the greater of eight percent of sales for the preceding week
or $200, the owner's weekly draw might be reduced by the amount
of such excess. The union pointed to these restrictions as evidence of
indirect control exercised by Southland over George's labor policies."'
The Board seemed to have been overly concerned with the
question of the franchisor's potential for indirect control in the pre-
viously summarized Article 14. 122 It is not, however, the possibility of
indirect control of labor relations, but the necessity for partial control
of a franchisee's labor policy which is inherent in a franchise relation-
112 Id.
120 "[Vloluntarism, as the basis for successful labor management relations . . . plays
.. an important role in collective bargaining, regardless of whether the spur is a narrow
or an enlightened self interest. From this approach certain conclusions may be drawn:
The parties must have authority, within their jurisdiction to speak for their principals
," M. Forkosch, A Treatise on Labor Law 852 (2d ed. 1965).
121 Southland Corp., 170 N.L.R.B. No. 159, 67 L.R.R.M. 1582, 1584 (1968).
122 See text accompanying notes 118-19 supra.
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ship. George's retail franchise is more than an outlet for Southland's
products. It is the Southland business. To the extent that George's
poor personnel practices, employee inefficiency or labor disputes
diminish gross sales or interrupt the franchise operation, the fran-
chisor's continuing financial interest (fifty-five percent of gross sales)
suffers.
The Board noted that, with one exception, Southland had not
exercised or attempted to exercise any influence over the labor rela-
tions policies of George.'" But this fact could equally have been
evidence of George's facility in handling employees, or, on the other
hand, proof of Southland's lack of interest or power. While no intelli-
gent employer interferes with a subordinate's successful management
of personnel, it is naive to suggest that a franchisor having absolute
power to terminate the relationship on thirty days' notice would
tolerate a franchisee's inept personnel practices. The decision of the
Board should not turn on either the apparent success of a brief
franchise relationship, or on the self-serving language of the contract.
The first factor is subject to chance, the second to the deft stroke of
a lawyer's pen.
In analogous situations, the Board has been more perceptive in
interpreting the right to control test. The joint employer doctrine has
been interpreted liberally, for example, to tie department store owners
to employment relationships with departmental lessees.'" Although
123
 Southland Corp., 170 N.L.R.B. No. 159, 67 L.R.R.M. 1582, 1584 (1968).
124 Despite occasional decisions to the contrary, the Board has established a strong
presumption that licensors and licensees in discount department stores are joint employers
of employees of the licensee. See Thriftown, Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. No. 42, 63 L.R.R.M.
1298 (1966) ; K-Mart, 162 N.L.R.B. No. 41, 64 L.R.R.M. 1045 (1966) ; Jewel Tea Corp.,
162 N.L.R.B. No. 44, 64 L.R.R.M. 1054 (1966) ; United Mercantile, Inc., 171 N.L.R.B.
No. 103, 68 L.R.R.M. 1173 (1968). Cf. Zayre Corp., 170 N.L.R.B. No. 190, 68 L.R.R.M.
1002 (1968). For a thorough summary of the Board's approach in the discount department
store cases before and after Thriftown, see Gallenkamp Stores Co. v. NLRB, 402 F.2d 525,
69 L.R.R.M. 2024 (9th Cir. 1968).
The Board's rationale for the rule derives from its perception of the "entrepreneurial
context" in which the license arrangements are utilized: 'Given this business arrangement,
it is apparent that any disruption of operations, including that resulting from a labor
dispute involving an operator Eof a licensed department], will almost necessarily ad-
versely affect the operation of the entire store." Thriftown, supra, 63 L.R.R.M. at 1300.
Although the rule appears to represent a departure from the criterion ordinarily used to
measure joint employer status—common control of labor relations—the Board later
observed that: "While we would not postulate the existence of a joint-employer relation-
ship merely on the basis of such a need—[of the licensor to control the labor relations of
its licensees—] we will make such a finding where the license arrangements objectively
demonstrate a response to that need." United Mercantile, Inc., supra, 68 L.R.R.M. at 1175.
It is apparent, however, that once the Board perceives a "need" for the licensor to con-
trol, the Board will find that need reflected in the license arrangement regardless of the
terms of the license. See Red-More Corp., 169 N.L.R.B. No. 63, 67 L.R.R.M. 1203
(1968).
The Board, however, has been reluctant to disturb unit determinations made prior
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the test used to determine joint employer status in such cases is theo-
retically the same as that used by the Board in Southland, these cases
examine the strength of the franchisor's right to control in terms of all
the ties he maintains with the franchisees, not just in terms of the
direct control he maintains over labor relations 126 This approach
could be used more openly and with greater precision if the Board
changed the test of joint employer status from one of weighing the
right of the stronger party to control labor relations practices to one
of evaluating the mutual concern of two or more parties in the working
conditions of a given unit of employees. If both the franchisor and fran-
chisee have a continuing financial interest in an enterprise, and possess
the power to protect it by either indirect or direct measures, a pre-
sumption should arise that they are joint employers for purposes of the
National Labor Relations Act.
The considerations invoked by the "mutual interest" test are
more pertinent to the ultimate question of who comprise the necessary
parties for successful collective bargaining. Under most franchise
agreements, including Southland's, the franchisor exercises significant
control over the financial structure and rate of profit of the individual
franchise. It is doubtful that most franchisee-employers could make
decisions regarding demands for significant changes in wages and
working conditions without first consulting the franchisor. Since an
absent franchisor would nevertheless be a brooding presence at the
bargaining table, the bargaining process would be expedited if he ap-
peared there himself.
Of course, the franchisor will invariably object to any legal inter-
pretation of his contract which characterizes him as a joint employer.
His power over the franchisee and the conduct of collective bargaining
is economic rather than legal in origin. He does not need an official title
to deal with the union through a franchisee. In addition, as Part III
will suggest, 12" the conferral of joint employer status may have dis-
advantageous consequences for the franchisor.
D. Combined Units: Franchisee-Employers and
Franchisee-Employees
Additional problems are presented when a franchisor has some
franchisees who are merely employees—single distributors—and others
who are themselves employers—multidistributors. The touchstone
of statutory status is the contractual power to control modes of
to TM., town, where the Board ordinarily did not define licensors and licensees as joint-
employers. See, e.g., Esgro Valley, Inc., 169 N.L.R.B. No. 13, 67 L.R.R.M. 1116 (1968).
125 See note 124 supra.
12a See pp. 260-65 infra,
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performance. Since the franchisor will probably use the same con-
tractual instrument throughout the enterprise, and therefore will
have the same quantum of power over each, both single and multi-
distributors will be subject to the same kinds of franchisor controls.
Thus if single distributors are defined as employees, it will be difficult
for the Board, using the traditional right to control test, to justify
a different label for the multidistributors. Assuming that multidis-
tributors, as well as single distributors, qualify as employees, are multi-
distributors more appropriately subcategorized as employee-super-
visors? If multidistributors were classified as supervisors, they would
not be eligible to vote in a representation election, nor would they
be entitled to the other protections provided by the Act.'"
The Board's response to questions concerning the statutory
status of multidistributors in this context has been somewhat vague
and generally inconsistent. In some cases the Board has dismissed the
contention that the franchisees are supervisors on grounds that their
employees are not employees of the franchisor.'" In other cases, the
Board has defined multidistributors as employee-supervisors.'" More
often the Board has, in effect, ignored the issue by excluding multidis-
tributors from an appropriate unit of single distributors.'"
127 See note 98 supra.
128 See, e.g., Quality Hay Co., 173 N.L.R.B. No. 172, 69 L.R.R.M. 1521 (1968).
128 See, e.g., S & W Motor Lines, 179 N.L.R.B. No. 136, 72 L.R.R.M. 1510 (1969)
where multiple owner-drivers of freight trucks were defined as supervisors. Of course the
drivers under them, and controlled and paid by them, had first been defined as the
employees of the employer.
A typical employment structure in the trucking industry was described by the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in NLRB v. Deaton Truck Line, Inc., 389 F.2d 163, 165,
67 L.R.R.M. 2632, 2633 (5th Cir. 1968):
tT]he owner and driver relationships . . . may be classified as follows: (1)
Deaton employees who drive Deaton owned trucks; (2) Owner-drivers who own
a single truck which they drive and lease to Deaton; (3) Multiple-Owner-drivers
who lease several trucks to Deaton, drive one of them and select drivers far the
others from among drivers approved by Deaton; (4) Non-driving owners and
(5) Non-Owner drivers who drive trucks owned by either a multiple-owned-
driver or by a non-driving owner . . . who has leased trucks to Deaton.
The Deaton employees, single owner-drivers and non-owner-drivers, were classified as
employees and multiple owner-drivers were classified as supervisors. Non-driver owners
were not defined as employees. Id. at 167, 67 L.R.R.M. at 2635 n. 12.
For the complete history of the lengthy dispute over the employment status of owner-
operator truck drivers used by Deaton, see Teamsters, Local 612 v. Deaton Truck Line,
Inc., 307 F.2d 748 (5th Cir. 1962) ; Deaton Truck Line, Inc., v. Teamsters Local 612, 314
F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1962) ; Deaton Truck Line, Inc. v. NLRB, 337 F.2d 697 (5th Cir,
1964) ; NLRB v. Deaton Truck Line, Inc., 389 F.2d 163, (5th Cir. 1968).
180 See, e.g., Mister Softee of Indiana, 162 N.L.R.B. No. 22, 64 L.R.R.M. 1034 (1966)
and Frito-Lay, Inc., 178 N.L.R.B. No. 92, 72 L.R.R.M. 1177 (1969). Presumably the
multidistributors are excluded because they did not share a community of interests with
the single distributors.
The Board has also excluded various classes of employees on "policy grounds." For
example, the Board has excluded two types of managerial employees: those so closely
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Various arguments may be posited for or against a particular
decision or its theory, but none of the usual responses adequately de-
scribes the intricate net of relationships that characterize the franchise
arrangement. A decision that multidistributors are nonsupervisory
employees might protect the interests of the multidistributors, but this
protection is achieved at the expense of the subemployees: a finding
that the multidistributor is not a supervisor implies that the multi-
distributor's employees are not employed by the franchisor."' The
subemployees are therefore excluded from the unit although their
interests may be identical to those of the single distributors.
A decision that the multidistributor is a supervisor permits in-
clusion of the subemployees, but would exclude the multidistributor
himself. However, the usual reason for excluding supervisory person-
nel from units of employees—that, theoretically, the interests and
loyalties of supervisors run to management—is not persuasive when
used to justify the exclusion of multidistributors. The employees
of the multidistributor are usually hired by, paid by, and directly
responsible to the multidistributor. They might be characterized as
employees of the franchisor because he authorizes and indirectly
controls their employment, but the relationship is at best the con-
clusion of a legal syllogism. Secondly, the franchisee who has em-
ployees is no more or less tied to the franchisor than is the single
distributor. Unlike the ordinary supervisor, he is not compensated
for supervising employees, nor does he represent the franchisor to the
subemployees. His compensation, like that of the single distributor,
related to or aligned with management as to raise the possibility of a conflict of interest
on the part of the employee; and those who formulate, determine or affect employer
policy. See Retail Clerks Local 880 v. NLRB, 366 F.2d 642, 644-46 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 386 U.S. 1017 (1967). For a discussion of the Board's rationale, see Westinghouse
Electric Corp. v. NLRB, 398 F.2d 669, 670-71 (6th Cir. 1968); for an illustration of how
the test is used in a situation analogous to a franchise situation, see Illinois State. Journal-
Register, Inc. v. NLRB, 412 F.2d 37 (7th Cir. 1969). See also Sida of Hawaii, Inc., 191
N.L.R.B. No. 46, 77 L.R.R.M. 1376 (1971) where 115 taxi cab drivers who owned stock
in the employer were excluded from a unit of 250 drivers on the ground that "[the
stockholder-drivers] have an effective voice in determining policy as well as the terms and
conditions of employment through their selection of the [employer's] directors."
It is apparent that if a franchisee did not have sufficient supervisory authority to be
counted a supervisor, he would often be treated as a managerial employee "aligned"
with management. In either case, he would be excluded from the union.
111
 The result is not required since it would be possible for the Board to find that
both the multidistributor and his employees are employees of the franchisor. But this
finding would often strain the facts since the multidistributor often hires, pays and
supervises the subemployees without the franchisor even knowing of their existence, If
the multidistributor can be characterized as a supervisor, then the hiring of the sub-
employees can be accounted for as an exercise of supervisory authority impliedly granted
by the franchisor. However, if the multidistributor is not defined as a supervisor, but as
an employee, the legal nexus necessary to tie the subemployees to the franchisor is lost.
See Quality Hay Co., 173 N.L.R.B. No. 172, 69 L.R.R.M. 1521 (1968).
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depends upon the terms of the franchise agreement and his own
personal efforts.
The third option available to the Board—that of excluding
multidistributors or their employees from the unit—can be a satis-
factory solution if it is used judiciously. The Board might determine,
for example, that either the multidistributor's financial investment or
his essentially managerial role makes it inappropriate to include him
in a unit of single distributors. The employees of the multidistributor,
depending on the nature of their tasks and on the amount of control
exercised over them by the franchisor, could conceivably be included
in a unit otherwise comprised of single distributors.
On the other hand, the Board will frequently allow the parties to
define a unit by private agreement. Although the Board maintains
ultimate control over the composition of the unit, in practice, the
decision of the parties will rarely be challenged. Consequently, the
multidistributor may be included in the unit if the union regards him
as a competitive threat to the employment opportunities of the single
distributors. Similarly, he might be excluded if the union or the fran-
chisor were unsure of the outcome of a representation election.
The preferable solution, in doubtful cases, would be to allow
multidistributors to indicate in the familiar "Globe" election 132
whether or not they wish to be represented by the union. The Globe
election procedure allows employees to determine whether they wish to
be included in a specified unit and, if they do, whether they wish to
be represented by the union(s) on the ballot. It ensures, to some
extent, that the franchisees and their employees, who do not com-
fortably fit any of the statutory categories, will not be manipulated
for the benefit of the other parties. Undoubtedly, some awkward
situations might arise, especially where, for example, single distribu-
tors, multidistributors and employees of multidistributors all choose
representation by the same union. Although, theoretically, the union
would face a conflict of interest in representing both the multidis-
tributors and their employees,)the decision by both to join the same
132 A "Globe" election takes its name from Globe Machine and Stamping Co.,
3 N.L.R.B. No. 25, IA L.R.R.M. 122 (1937). Under procedures first established by this
case, when a group of employees might properly constitute a separate unit or form
part of a larger unit, the Board permits the desires of the employee to be the determining
factor. Separate elections are conducted among the groups, and the determination of the
unit or units is withheld pending the results of the elections. Those groups which do not
elect the union constitute separate units, while those groups voting for representation by
the union are placed in the larger unit.
Although the "Globe" election is usually used to allow craft employees to opt for
representation by a craft union rather than by an industrial union, it could also be
adopted to permit franchisees and their employees to opt out of union representation
altogether.
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union would probably indicate that the franchisor is in control of all
subordinate parties to the franchise relationship.
III. IMPLICATIONS OF APPLYING THE NLRA TO THE
FRANCHISE ARRANGEMENT
The consequences of an affirmative jurisdictional finding by the
NLRB will depend upon several interrelated factors, including the
context in which the issue is raised, the type of franchise involved, and
the substantive issues raised and resolved in the course of the pro-
ceeding. The assumption of jurisdiction over the franchise relationship
and the subsequent application of various provisions of the NLRA to
the activities of the parties will often determine the legitimacy or use-
fulness of the franchise technique. Even when not invoked, federal
labor laws exert a subtle influence on the power relationship between
franchisors and franchisees. Thus, the possibility that the NLRB will
assert jurisdiction, and the consequences of such an assertion, should
be important considerations in the franchisor's initial decision to use
franchising as a method of distribution. This section analyzes the
implications of an assertion of jurisdiction in the execution, implemen-
tation, administration and termination of the franchise relationship.
A. The Initiation of a Franchise Program
A manufacturer, distributor or wholesaler who decides to initiate
a franchise system will ordinarily seek to maximize his control of the
system by reserving a right to control the activities of individual fran-
chisees. Generally, the franchisor will impose upon the franchisee a
one-sided contractual agreement which does little more than identify
the franchisor's rights and the franchisee's responsibilities, and pro-
vide penalties for failure to discharge such responsibilities.'" If the
franchisor uses his superior knowledge and financial power to force
the franchisee into an unfavorable, perhaps unconscionable, bargain-
ing position, the franchisee may find little relief in the civil courts.
However, by maximizing his advantage, the franchisor risks the
possibility that the franchisee will seek to remedy his poor bargaining
position through collective action and makes it more likely that the
NLRB will find that the franchisees are employees.
The franchisor can attempt to minimize the likelihood of fran-
chisee union activity by negotiating a reasonable agreement and by
administering a fair program. He can also lessen the likelihood that
the Board will take jurisdiction of a representation petition by avoid-
ing unnecessarily stringent control provisions in the agreement and in
the administration of the program. Although the Board is more
188 See pp. 221-24 supra.
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interested in the realities of the parties' economic relationship than in
the verbal niceties of .their contractual instrument, the "right to con-
trol" is still the official test used to determine the relationship between
the franchisor and franchisee.'" The franchisor should, therefore,
decide whether close contractual or de facto controls are sufficiently
important to warrant the risks they entail.
A decision by the Board that the franchisees are employees does
not necessarily have immediate consequences. Such a decision, made
in the course of a representation proceeding, will achieve three results.
First, the decision resolves the jurisdictional issue—the Board will
take jurisdiction of a representation petition involving the franchisee-
employees. Second, the decision, in effect, determines the appropriate
unit for bargaining. If the franchisee-distributors are employees, they
are appropriate members of a single unit, although, as noted pre-
viously, multidistributors may be excluded from the unit either by the
Board or pursuant to the parties' stipulation. Finally, the decision
gives franchisee-employees the right to decide whether they wish to be
represented by a union. It is, of course, entirely possible that the
franchisees may reject the petitioning union(s) in a secret ballot
election. In that event, the franchise arrangement would be admin-
istered as it was prior to the Board's intervention. Although charac-
terized as employees, the franchisees, by voting against unionization,
would thus elect to be treated as independent contractors.
If the franchisees were to elect union representation, that de-
cision would certainly alter, and perhaps destroy, the franchise rela-
tionship. The collective bargaining representative may choose to
ignore the franchise agreements, which would now be classified as
individual employment contracts, and insist on a standard agreement
in lieu of the franchise contracts.'" Such a course of action by a union
would go far toward destroying the substance, as well as the trappings,
of the franchise relationship. Alternatively, the union might bargain
for the incorporation of the franchise contracts into a more inclusive
collective bargaining contract, thereby preserving the structure of the
franchise arrangement while strengthening the bargaining position of
the individual franchisees.'" The strategy of the union will depend in
part on the terms of the agreement. If they are particularly unfavor-
able to the franchisee, their preservation might be undesirable. If the
134 See the discussion of Carnation Co., 172 N.L.R.B. No. 215, 69 L.R.R.M. 1127
(1968) at pp. 236-38 supra.
133 See J. 1. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944).
133 See Chicago Tri-Cities Motor Freight, Inc., 168 N.L.R.B. No. 86, 67 L.R.R.M.
1190 (1967), where the lease agreements between the employer and owner-operators pro-
vided for cancellation upon 30 days' written notice by either party. Under the terms of
the union contract, however, an owner whose lease was cancelled continued to be
employed as a driver.
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structure of the agreement is considered sound, the union might
bargain for its incorporation and seek to make advantageous changes
in its substantive provisions.
If a franchisor desired to initiate a more extensive franchise pro-
gram, requiring substantial capital investment by the franchisee and
the use of employees, the problem would involve different kinds of
labor law issues with concomitant changes in the impact a Board
decision would have upon the franchise relationship. Despite such
differences, however, some similarities to the case of the single dis-
tributor-franchisee remain. For example, the franchisor of an exten-
sive program is as interested in maintaining strong lines of control to
each franchised outlet as is the franchisor of single distributorships.
The contracts used will often contain similar provisions, although the
exercise of the franchisor's retained power will differ. In the case of
a single distributor, the franchisor is concerned with maintaining
reasonable production levels, whereas the franchisor of a larger enter-
prise, while interested in production levels, must achieve those by
training the franchisee as a manager rather than as a producer. The
kinds of controls exercised in the larger franchise enterprise tend,
therefore, to concern managerial responsibilities. For example, the
franchisor will be interested in the accounting techniques, inventory
control and personnel practices of the franchisee. In a service enter-
prise he will be particularly interested in ensuring that the franchisee
will hire, train and retain courteous and efficient employees.
Unlike the franchisor of single distributors, the franchisor in the
larger enterprise need not be concerned with the possibility that his
franchisees will attempt to form a union, or that the Board will clas-
sify him as the employer of those franchisees. Any attempt by the
franchisees of large outlets to form a labor organization would be
viewed with suspicion by the Antitrust Division of the Department
of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission.'" In any event, the
187
 In Bambury Fashions, Inc., 179 N.L.R.B. No. 75, 72 L.R.R.M. 1350 (1969), the
National Association of Women's and Children's Apparel Salesman (NAWCAS) filed a
petition seeking a representation election among traveling salesmen of women's and chil-
dren's apparel. The Board dismissed the petition on the grounds that, although some .of
the 12,500 salesmen that NAWCAS sought to represent were employees of apparel manu-
facturers, most were "independent contractors" since the salesmen were "granted the right
to control the means by which the manufacturer's line of apparel is sold within a defined
territory, and the manufacturer retains the right to control only the result." Id. at 1353.
Consequently, the NAWCAS was disqualified from representing the employee-salesmen
when its membership included competing employer-independent contractors.
The Board noted that the representation petition bad been filed by NAWCAS "in
order to avoid prosecution by the Federal Trade Commission in a restraint of trade
complaint proceeding." Id. at 1350. "[A] hearing examiner of that agency issued an
initial decision, on April 18, 1968, that NAWCAS and its agents, in a number of the
practices they follow and rules and regulations they impose on their members in connection
with trade show activities, have engaged in illegal restraints of trade." Id. at 1353,
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Board has not permitted the larger franchisees to utilize the Act's
protections in order to bargain collectively with their franchisors. The
franchisor might, however, be defined as a joint employer of the
franchisees' employees if they seek to organize or engage in concerted
activities. To the extent that the franchisor retains a right to control
the labor relation practices of his franchisees or, in fact, does exercise
such control, the greater is the risk that the Board will tie the fran-
chisor to the franchisees' employees. There is also a strong suggestion
in the reported cases that the probability of the Board's finding a joint
employer status increases in proportion to the amount of generalized
control that can be or is exercised by the franchisor.'"
A finding that the franchisor is a joint employer of the franchisee's
employees, when made in the course of a representation proceeding,
will have one immediate legal consequence: the decision will ensure
that the employer's enterprise will satisfy the "jurisdictional yard-
sticks" which limit the Board's jurisdiction. Since the franchisor's
sales or revenue figures will be added to those of the franchisee, it is
unlikely that the joint enterprise will fail to reach the minimal amounts
set by the Board. On the other hand, an adverse decision on the
The Federal Trade Commission has jurisdiction under Section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act, 15 U.S.C.	 45 (1970), to enforce both the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.
1 et seq. (1970), and the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 	 12 et seq. (1970). Section 6 of the
Clayton Act exempts "labor organizations" from the antitrust laws. If the NAWCAS
were defined as a labor organization, it would be exempt from the "restraint of trade"
prohibitions of Section I of the Sherman Act. But it is doubtful that the FTC or the
courts would be bound by the Board's definition of a labor organization or by its char-
acterization of an employment relationship. In Columbia River Packers v. Hinton, 315
U.S. 143 (1942), fishermen, who teased boats and sold their catch to processors, formed
a, union which bargained collectively with the processors to fix the price. Members sold
only to processors who had union contracts, and processors under contract bought only
from union members. One processor who refused to contract with the union was boycotted.
He sought an injunction under the Sherman Act. The Court held that this was not a
labor dispute within the Norris-LaGuardia Act but was a dispute between businessmen
over the sale of a commodity. There was therefore, no employer-employee relationship,
but a combination in restraint of trade. Although the union had not been certified by the
Board, it is clear that, at best, such a decision would have been only persuasive evidence,
not a res judicata finding. (For a highly critical analysis of Hinton see Gottesman,
Restraint of Trade—Employees or Enterprisers?, 15 U. Chi. L. Rev. 638 (1948).) Similarly,
the Board will accept the ruling of a sister agency on the employment relationship as
persuasive, but not binding. In Yellow Cab Co., 179 N.L.R.B. No. 148, 72 L.R.R.M. 1514
(1969), where the employment relationship was at issue, the Board noted that the em-
ployer had "moved the Board to reopen the hearing for the purpose of adducing evidence
that the Internal Revenue Service has recently rendered an administrative decision holding
that the [taxi] drivers are independent contractors and not employees .... Although we
consider such a decision to be relevant, . . . we respectfully decline to follow it . ."
Id. at 1516 n. 5.
138 See Red-More Corp., 164 N.L.R.B. No. 93, 65 L.R.R.M. 1155 (1967), aff'd, 169
N.L.R.13, No. 63, 67 L.R.R.M. 1203 (1968), enf'd, 418 F.2d 890 (9th Cir. 1969).
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joint employer issue, as in Southland,'" will often require Board
dismissal of the representation petition on the jurisdictional ground.
The franchisor, therefore, will usually attempt to prove that he is not
a joint employer with his franchisee.
A union seeking to represent the franchisees' employees will cer-
tainly attempt to include the franchisor as a joint employer. If the
union cannot establish a joint employer relationship, it will argue in
the alternative that the franchisor is the sole employer and that the
franchisee is his supervisory-employee. From the union's point of
view it would be irrelevant whether the Board asserted jurisdiction
on the basis of the joint employer or supervisor relationship. In terms
of the relationship between franchisor and franchisee, the conse-
quences of defining the franchisee as &supervisor have been previously
discussed.' In either event, the enterprise would become subject to
the NLRA.
A finding of joint employer status would have no immediate conse-
quences. The employees of the franchisee would be given the oppor-
tunity to choose or reject a collective bargaining representative. If the
employees chose a collective bargaining representative, the franchisor
might find it necessary to supervise carefully the personnel practices
of his franchisee, especially his relationship with the union. This is
true for several reasons. First, the franchisor is more likely to have
the experience, expertise and personnel required to negotiate and ad-
minister a collective bargaining agreement. Second, the franchisor
will be interested in proper dealings with the union to ensure, on the
one hand, that unnecessary work stoppages are avoided and, on the
other hand, that costly wage increases are resisted. Third, the joint
employer is jointly and severally liable for any financial liabilities in-
curred as a result of the unfair labor practices of his co-employer."'
Finally, and most importantly, the franchisor realizes that any union
problems arising in one franchise outlet might endanger the fran-
chisor's business in other outlets.
In sum, when a businessman decides to use franchising, whether
by recruiting single distributors with their meager investment or by
training potential entrepreneurs who invest substantially in the enter-
prise, his choice of contract language and his control of the franchisee
may well justify an assertion of jurisdiction by the NLRB. The effects
189 170 N.L.R.B. No. 159, 67 L.R.R.M. 1582 (1968) ; see pp. 239-45 supra.
140 See note 98 and accompanying text supra.
141 See NLRB v. Frontier Guard Patrol, Inc., 399 F.2d 716 (10th Cir. 1968) for
an excellent analysis of the rationale and use of the joint employer doctrine in unfair
labor practice proceedings.
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of the Board's decision will vary according to the type of franchise
involved.
B. Adoption of Franchising by an Ongoing Enterprise
Where an employer distributes products or services directly
through employees, he may decide to convert to a franchising system
of distribution using one of two methods. He may terminate his em-
ployment relationship with the employees and franchise either indi-
vidual former employees or new purchasers; or he may divide his enter-
prise into geographical segments and assign franchise territories to
individual or corporate entrepreneurs, who in turn would sell fran-
chises to individual franchisees. In either case, he may very well
encounter serious problems under provisions of the National Labor
Relations Act, especially Sections 8(a) (1), 8 (a) (3) and 8(a) (5).
Sections 8(a) (1) 142
 and 8(a) (3) 142 forbid an employer to inter-
fere with the organizational activities of employees by threats, coer-
cion or actual discrimination with respect to hiring or tenure of em-
ployment. It is an unfair labor practice, therefore, for employers to
coerce their employees in an attempt to dissuade them from forming,
joining or assisting labor organizations. Similarly, it is an unfair prac-
tice for employers to terminate, transfer, demote, or decrease the
compensation of employees as retaliation for union activities. Section
8(a) (5) 144 requires employers to bargain in good faith with respect
to hours, wages and other terms and conditions of employment. In
addition, the Board often insists that an employer negotiate certain
decisions with a union during the term of an existing agreement, in-
cluding decisions to relocate the enterprise, subcontract out tasks, or
terminate the enterprise. An employer who decides to franchise an
enterprise which is unionized, or who initiates franchising during a
union organizational campaign, may well become enmeshed in unfair
labor practice litigation involving charges of violations of sections
(a) (1), (3) or (5). The response of the Board to these charges will,
in part, depend upon its initial characterization of the franchise rela-
tionship. The Board's resolution of the issues arising from the charges
could well have an important impact on the quality of the franchise
relationship.
Before considering the genuinely perplexing problems that arise
when franchising . is utilized as a legitimate response to problems
encountered in product distribution, we must first consider issues
arising from a deliberate use of franchising to frustrate employees'
142 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1) (1970).
10 29 U.S.C. § 158(2)(3) (1970).
144 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1970).
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rights. The Board has not hesitated to expose as a sham a franchise
program obviously designed to prevent current employees from en-
gaging in organizational activities.'" Although the motive of the em-
ployer in initiating a franchise program is not always clear, where the
initiation of a union organizational campaign and the decision to
franchise coincide, a strong presumption is raised that the franchising
program is an illegal response to the organizational attempt. The
"sale" of franchises to former employees via long-term credit obliga-
tions is strong evidence that an employer has violated section 8(a) ( 1).
Yet, in cases where the motives for franchising are mixed or un-
clear, the Board has found it difficult to convince reviewing courts that
the initiation of franchising by an ongoing enterprise necessarily vio-
lates sections 8(a) (1), 8(a) (3) or 8(a) (5). In Carnation Co.,"° for
example, the company had employed over one hundred route drivers
to distribute its dairy products; the drivers were represented by a
Teamster local. Two months after negotiating a new contract, the
company began negotiating individual distributorship agreements with
its employee-drivers. The union charged the employer with violations
of sections 8(a) (1) and 8(a) (5). At the time of the hearing, ap-
proximately one-third of the drivers had signed the franchise agree-
ments. Four drivers who had elected not to sign the agreements were
terminated. The Board found that, despite the franchise agreement,
the driver-distributors were still employees covered by the bargaining
contract and that Carnation's bargaining with its individual drivers
constituted a violation of sections 8(a) (1) and 8(a) (5). In the
alternative, the Board found that the employer had violated sections
8(a) (1) and 8(a) (5) by failing to bargain concerning the decision to
change the status of the route men.147
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals denied enforcement of the
Board's order that the four discharged drivers be reinstated with back
pay.'" The court held that since the driver-distributors had been
145 In Borden, Inc., 181 N.L.R.B. No. 19, 73 L.R.R.M. 1583 (1970), the Board
dealt summarily with the employer's attempt to circumvent his contractual obligations
with a certified collective bargaining agent by unilaterally instituting a franchise program.
The employer imposed the franchise status on current employees by threatening to sell
their routes if they refused to participate in the new program. The Board found a viola-
tion of 8(a) (5), noting that the newly formed franchise "represents nothing more than
a unique plan by the employer to shift some of its operating costs to the vendor who now
more than ever is subservient to the employer's wishes and desires." Id. at 1584. In
Borden, Inc., 192 N.L.R.B. No. 7, 77 L.R.R.M. 1532 (1971), the Board reaffirmed the
above finding in 181 N.L.R.B. No. 19, 73 L.R.R.M. 1583 (1970), reiterating that the
employees involved remained employees and did not become independent contractors as
contended by the employer. Id.
140 172 N.L.R.B. No. 215, 69 L.R.R.M. 1127 (1968).
147 Id., 69 L.R.R.M. at 1128.
148 Carnation Co. v. NLRB, 429 F.2d 1130, 74 L.R.R.M. 2311 (9th Cir. 1970).
255
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
effectively transformed into independent contractors, the company was
not under a continuing obligation to observe the collective bargaining
agreement."' The court remanded the case for further proceedings on
the question of whether the franchise program was unilaterally imposed
by the employer in violation of section 8(a) (5) and directed the
Board to fashion a remedy that would take into account the termination
of the employment relationship.'"
The refusal of the court to enforce the Board's order, although
understandable because of the Board's previous position in a related
matter, raises numerous questions concerning the franchise relation-
ship, the proper application of Agency principles and the proper
roles of the Board and appellate courts. Prior to its decision in
Carnation, the Board had, in effect, permitted Shamrock Dairy, one
of the franchisor's competitors in the Phoenix area, to enter into dis-
tributorship agreements with its employees during the term of a
collective bargaining agreement."' On the belated advice of counsel,
Carnation decided to do the same.'" Arguably, it was unfair for the
Board to change its rules in such a way as to create competitive
disadvantages for one employer or one group of employers. However,
the Board is, and must be, free to overrule itself. Nonetheless, the
appellate court, although recently instructed by the Supreme Court to
defer to the Board's expertise in cases involving employee status,'
substituted its own interpretation of the facts in the record. Further-
more, the court insisted that its decision was not only faithful to Agency
principles, but also more in conformity with the purpose of the Act."
The court not only ruled that the employer had successfully
transformed its employees into independent contractors; it also indi-
cated that even if the Board had found that Carnation violated section
8(a) (5) by refusing to bargain its decision to franchise, the Board
could not remedy the violation by compelling Carnation to distribute
its products through employee drivers. On application by the Board
for an order modifying the opinion, the court agreed that the Board
had the power to order a restoration of the status quo to remedy a
violation of section 8(a) (5)—that is, to compel the employer to
149 Id. at 1135, 74 L.R.R.M, at 2315.
155 Id. at 1136, 74 L.R.R.M. at 2315.
151 Shamrock Dairy, Inc., 124 N.L.R.B. No. 63, 44 L.R.R.M. 1407 (1959) and 119
N.L.R.B. No. 134, 46 L.R.R.M. 2433 (1957), aff'd sub nom. International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Local 310 v. NLRB, 280 F.2d 665 (D.C. Cir.) cert. denied, 364 U.S. 892 (1960).
152
 Carnation Co. v. NLRB, 429 F.2d 1130, 1132-33, 74 L.R.R.M. 2311, 2313 (9th
Cir. 1970).
153
 NLRB v. United Insurance Co. of America, 390 U.S. 254 (1968).
154
 Carnation Co. v. NLRB, 429 F.2d 1130, 1133-34, 74 L.R.R.M. 2311, 2313-14 (9th
Cir. 1970).
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observe the union contract while negotiating the franchise program—
but the court clearly indicated that it would consider such a remedy
to be an abuse of the Board's discretion. 1615 On remand, the Board held
that the employer had not violated section 8(a) (5). The Board found
that the employer had, in fact, initiated discussions concerning possible
adoption of a franchise system, and that the union had refused to
cooperate. Since the parties had reached an impasse on the issue, the
Board concluded that the employer was free to make changes in its
distribution system.
The implications of the court's decision are somewhat startling:
employers are free to circumvent contractual commitments by "fran-
chising" their distribution system to current employees; and, even
though the Board may find a violation of section 8(a) (5), it is power-
less to prevent the circumvention. This decision, however, is limited by
a unique set of facts. The Board had previously found on a similar
record that an employer had not violated the Act by franchising his
distribution routes.'" The decision and order had been enforced.
Then, without overruling the prior decision, the Board reached a
contrary conclusion with regard to a competitor of the previous em-
ployer.'" Since the Board had acted unfairly, the court's decision was,
perhaps, nothing more " than judicial reaction to administrative in-
competence.
A franchisor is particularly vulnerable to other charges under
section 8(a) (5). Assume, for example, that a manufacturer organizes
a franchise distribution system using driver-distributors. If he uses
a standard franchise agreement, the Board probably would charac-
terize his franchisees as employees in either a representation or unfair
labor practice case. The franchisor might hope to avoid unionization
by creating a remunerative, well-managed system for the franchisee;
more likely, he will give little, if any, consideration to the possibility
of unionization. Given the difficulties involved in organizing small
numbers of widely dispersed store clerks or drivers, it is unlikely that
the service sponsor-retailer will have to face an organization campaign.
On the other hand, all franchisee-employees who engage in concerted
activity are entitled to the protections of the National Labor Relations
Act. If two franchisees approach a franchisor and request or demand
a change in the franchise contract, an attempt by the franchisor to
penalize the franchisees might violate sections 8(a) (1) and 8(a) (3). 168
155 Carnation Co. v. NLRB, 429 F.2d 1130, 1136, 75 L.R.R.M. 2046 (9th Cir. 1970).
15° Shamrock Dairy, Inc., 124 N.L.R.B. No. 63, 44 L.R.R.M. 1407 (1959).
157 See text accompanying notes 151-52 supra.
158 Cf. Latex Industries, Inc., 132 N.L.R.B. No. 3, 48 L.R.R.M. 1310 (1961); Ryder
Tank Lines, Inc., 135 N.L.R.B. No. 95, 49 L.R.R.M. 1597 (1962).
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Similarly, any other concerted activity related to wages, hours or terms
and conditions of employment is protected by section 7. 1"
More importantly, once a group of franchisees persuades the
NLRB that its members are employees, and elects union representa-
tion, the franchisor will be severely circumscribed by section 8(a) (5)
in his freedom to modify or terminate franchise agreements. If a union
utilizes its right to ignore the individual franchise agreements and
bargains without reference to them, or incorporates them by reference
into a collective agreement with appropriate modifications, the em-
ployer might not be able to terminate or even modify his basic dis-
tribution system without first negotiating the decision with the union
representative.'" Assuming the existence of the usual union security
169 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970). The definition of a "protected activity" is often a diffi-
cult one; see NLRB v. Thayer Co., 213 F.2d 743, 34 L.R.R.M. 2250 (1st Cir. 1954), for
an excellent discussion of the concept in the context of the reinstatement rights of strikers.
It is fairly safe to say that if a group of employees acts in concert in an attempt to
negotiate or improve wages, hours or conditions of employment, their termination by an
employer would be violative of sections 8(a) (1) and 8(a)(3). See, e.g., Western Con-
tracting Corp. v. NLRB 322 F.2d 893, 54 L.R.R.M. 2216 (10th Cir. 1963); but cf.
NLRB v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 147 F.2d 262, 16 L.R.R.M. 501 (6th Cir. 1945);
NLRB v. Deaton Truck Line, Inc., 389 F.2d 163, 67 L.R.R.M. 2632 (5th Cir. 1968).
See also, Schatzki, Some Observations and Suggestions Concerning a Misnomer—
"Protected" Concerted Activities, 47 Texas L. Rev. 378 (1969).
100 In Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964), the Court
enforced a Board decision ordering an employer to bargain with the representative of
unit employees the decision to replace his maintenance employees with those of an
independent contractor. Although the majority opinion by Chief Justice Warren and the
concurring opinion by Mr. Justice Stewart carefully avoided imposing an obligation to
bargain all decisions to subcontract, the Board early interpreted Fibreboard as imposing
a general duty on employers to bargain decisions to subcontract—see, e.g., Master Ap-
pliance Corp., 158 N.L.R.B. No. 96, 62 L.R.R.M. 1170 (1966); Billups Western Petroleum
Co., 169 N.L.R.B. No. 147, 67 L.R.R.M. 1323 (1968)—but later required that a decision
must have an adverse impact on the employees or unit job opportunities before the
bargaining obligation arises. The Board also at first interpreted the decision as requiring
the employer to bargain concerning decisions to close its plant, see Ozark Trailers, Inc.,
161 N.L.R.B. No. 48, 63 L.R.R.M. 1264, (1966); to remove or relocate, see Cooper
Thermometer Co., 160 N.L,R.B. No. 150, 63 L.R.R.M. 1219 (1966); or to make basic
structural changes which adversely affect unit employees, see Cloverleaf Div. of Adams
Dairy Co., 147 N.L.R.B. No. 133, 56 L.R.R.M. 1321 (1964).
It should be noted that the Board has consistently experienced difficulty in per-
suading appellate courts to accept its expansionary interpertation of Fibreboard. See, e.g.,
NLRB v. Acme Industrial Products, Inc., 439 F.2d 40 (6th Cir., 1971), where the court
rejected the Board's contention that the employer violated section 8(a) (5) by refusing
to bargain a decision to relocate one plant's operations, for economic reasons, to another
plant; the employer was willing to bargain all other aspects of the move. The court re-
jected what it perceived as the Board's "too broad a view of the . . . Fibreboard
[decision)" and distinguished the present case on the ground that the employer stood
ready to bargain on all aspects of the decision except the decision itself. Id. at 42. See
also NLRB v. Adams Dairy, Inc., 350 F.2d 108 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
1011 (1966). Nonetheless, the Board has not abandoned its expansionary reading of
Fibreboard and, as Adams Dairy illustrates, the Board would likely apply it to franchise
closings. Cf. Drapery Mfg. Co., 170 N.L.R.B. No. 199, 68 L.R.R.M. 1027 (1968).
In a recent decision, the Board indicated that it may be taking a new direction.
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provision, the franchisor would also be unable to utilize the one- or
thirty-day termination provisions.16"
As a joint employer, the franchisor may find similar serious
restraints placed upon the management of his franchised units by
section 8(a) (5). Under many franchise agreements, the franchisor
has the power to terminate the franchise unilaterally. Although
franchise agreements can often be interpreted to require some breach
of a contractual condition by the franchisee in order to justify a sum-
mary termination,'" the franchisee is rarely in a position to challenge
the franchisor's decision. Consequently, the power to terminate the
franchise constitutes the franchisor's most powerful weapon to ensure
high standards of performance and prompt payment of fees and rents
on the part of the franchisee. As a joint employer, the franchisor
could still exercise the termination power (assuming there exist no
contractual restrictions), but not with the same reckless abandon. If,
for example, the franchisor terminated both the franchise enterprise
and the franchisee, the Board, using extensions of the "Fibreboard"
doctrine, could require the employer to bargain with a union represent-
ing the franchise employees.' 63 The franchisor might face additional
problems should he decide to make basic structural changes in an
ongoing franchise. To the extent these revisions affect the wages,
hours, terms and conditions of employment of the franchisee, the
franchisor will be compelled to negotiate them not only with the
In General Motors Corp., GMC Truck & Coach Div., 191 N.L.R.B. No. 149, 77 L.R.R.M.
1537 (1971), a majority of the Board held that the employer was not obliged to bargain
a decision to sell its Houston Truck Center. A decision to sell, according to the majority,
in which a significant investment or withdrawal of capital will affect the scope and
ultimate direction of an enterprise, is a matter essentially financial and managerial in
nature. Such a decision, the majority stated, lies at the very core of entrepreneurial
control and is not the type of subject which Congress intended to encompass within
the mandatory subjects of bargaining. Members Fanning and Brown dissented, adhering
to the expansionary reading previously given to the Fibreboard decision in Ozark
Trailers, Cooper Thermometer and Adams Dairy, supra. It is quite apparent that the
Nixon Board will, in general, adhere closely to the limiting factors of Fibreboard: the
only managerial decisions subject to the bargaining obligation arc those decisions involving
a decision to sub-contract work previously ,performed by members of the unit, and
which will cause members to lose their employment. But see C. A. Scott, 192 N.L.R.B.
No. 30, 77 L.R.R.M. 1718 (1971), where the Board recently held that a unilateral de-
cision by the employer to eliminate work in one department of the enterprise put the
employer in violation of section 8(a) (5).
ni It is assumed, of course, that the union will restrict the employer's right to
discharge employees to situations involving a failure of the employee to discharge his
duties, or to situations where the employer must reduce his work force due to a decrease
in business. The employer could still discharge the franchisee, but, under the usual union
security provision, he would have to state a reason.
102 Gellhorn, Limitations on Contract Termination Rights—Franchise Cancellations,
1967 Duke Li. 465; Note, Article Two of the Uniform Commercial Code and Franchise
Distribution Agreements, 1969 Duke L.J. 969. •
163 See note 160 supra.
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franchisee, but also with the employees' collective bargaining repre-
sentative.18' If the franchisor were able to substitute a new franchisee
without making basic alterations in the structure of the enterprise,
the new franchisee might inherit current (unionized) employees with
the usual contractual restrictions on their terminations. For a potential
franchisee, the combination of a union, a collective bargaining agree-
ment in which he did not participate, and a group of left-over em-
ployees might mar the attractiveness of even a financially successful
enterprise. •
Another important problem for the franchisor centers upon the
meaning given the phrases "wages" and "terms and conditions of
employment" in the franchise context. Since the franchisee's com-
pensation is usually the difference between the gross cost of the dis-
tributed product or service and the retail price, any changes in the
price of supplies or services would have to be negotiated because they
would affect the compensation or "wages" of the franchisee. The
franchisor's right to modify fee payments or royalties would be sub-
ject to the same limitations. Although the franchisor could negotiate
the right to make these decisions without consulting the union repre-
sentative, it is rare for the union to surrender control of these crucial
decisions to the employer's discretion.'"
C. The Administration of a Franchise Program: Problems
with Picketing and Boycotts
Prospective franchisors and franchisees should anticipate, during
the life of the franchise, the possibility of becoming involved in strike,
picketing and boycott activities by labor organizations. These activities
may occur in a variety of circumstances and they raise the problem of
104
 In Dixie Ohio Express Co., 167 N.L.R.B. No. 72, 66 L.R.R.M. 1092 (1967),
the Board held that an employer was required to bargain a reorganization of his opera-
tions involving the loss of unit jobs with the representative of the employees. The Board
has also held that, where an employer's contracting-out resulted in a loss of reasonably
anticipated work opportunities for unit employees, as in Shurtenda Steaks, Inc., 161
N.L.R.B. No. 88, 63 L.R.R.M. 1407 (1966), or where the subcontracting resulted in a
loss of overtime, as in Cities Service Oil Co., 158 N.L.R.B. No. 120, 62 L.R.R.M. 1175
(1966), the employer was under an obligation to bargain the decision. The logical
reading of the cases in combination indicates that where an employer's change in opera-
tional methods causes some adverse impact on the employees, the decision to implement
the change would have to be bargained with the union. Thus, where a franchisor
"requests" a franchisee to reduce his hours of operation, to cut labor costs, to change
operational methods resulting in few unit jobs or reduced overtime, or to agree to
increased franchise fees, royalty payments or product costs, the union might persuade
the Board that these organizational or financial adjustments by the joint employer will
have an adverse impact on wages or conditions.
loe! Cox and Dunlop, Regulation of Collective Bargaining by the National Labor
Relations Board, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 389, 407-11 (1950).
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how to characterize the franchise relationship so as to determine the
applicability of Sections 8(b) (4) and 8(b) (7) of the NLRA.
Section 8(b) (4),160
 which prohibits secondary boycotts, is de-
signed to isolate "neutral" employers and their employees from the
disruptive effects of labor disputes between other employers and their
employees. A secondary boycott is an attempt by a union to involve
and inconvenience neutral employers or employees in order to bring
pressure on the "primary employer" with whom the union has its
dispute. Thus the section makes it an unfair labor practice for a union
to engage in a strike or boycott to compel a neutral employer to stop
doing business with a primary employer, or to persuade neutral em-
ployees to withdraw their services from their employer. The section
does not protect employers from the effects of "primary" picketing
directed at the employer with whom the union has a dispute, even if
the neutral employer is prevented from making pick-ups or deliveries
as a result of the picketing."' Nor does it protect employers who
"ally" themselves with the primary employer by agreeing to handle
material which otherwise would have been handled by the striking
employers.188
 Finally, the Board has held that employers who are so
closely controlled by the primary employer so as to be part of a
"single integrated enterprise" cannot claim the protection of 8(b) (4)
as "neutral" employers.'" Section 8(b)(7) 1" restricts organizational
picketing—picketing which is designed to secure employer recognition
1" 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (1970).
167 NLRB v. International Rice Milling Co., 341 U.S. 665 (1951). See also the
proviso to § 8(b) (4) (B) added by Congress in 1959. The gloss on 8(b) (4) is extensive
and short summaries of its varied implications are inevitably misleading. For excellent
analysis of the scope and detail of 8(b) (4) see Lesnick, The Gravamen of the Secondary
Boycott, 62 Colum. L. Rev. 1363 (1962); Lesnick, Job Security and Secondary Boycotts:
The Reach of NLRA Sections 8(b)(4) and 8(e), 113 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1000 (1965).
168 The "ally doctrine" had its origin in an opinion by Judge Rifkind in Douds
v. Metropolitan Federation of Architects, Local 231, 75 F. Supp. 672 (S.D.N.Y. 1948),
and its use by the N.L.R.B. was approved in NLRB v. Business Machine and Office
Appliance Mechanics, Local 459, 228 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 962
(1956). For a critical analysis of the doctrine, see Asher, Secondary Boycotts—Allied,
Neutral and Single Employers, 52 Geo. L.J. 406 (1964).
1" See note 174 infra.
170 Section 8(b)(7) (C), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7)(C) (1970), prohibits a union from
engaging in picketing designed to "persuade" an employer to recognize or bargain with
that union when the picketing extends beyond a reasonable period, unless the union files
a representation petition prior to the expiration of that period. Upon filing, an expedited
election will be conducted by the Board. Where the union fails to file the petition, § 10-1
requires the Regional Director in the appropriate region to secure injunctive relief in a
federal district court. See generally, Local 681, Joint Executive Board of Hotel And
Restaurant Employees, 130 N.L.R.B. No. 68, 47 L.R.R.M. 1321 (1961), supplemental
decision and order, 135 N.L.R.B, No. 124, 49 L.R.R.M. 1648 (1962), aff'd sub nom.
Smitley v. NLRB, 327 F.2d 351 (9th Cir., 1964).
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of the union as the collective bargaining representative of the em-
ployees. It is important to note that such picketing is prohibited only
when designed to force an employer to recognize the union as the
bargaining agent of his employees.
' The inherent limitations on the protections offered by these sec-
tions have important implications for the franchised enterprise. The
possibility that the franchisor or franchisee might be involved in, or
be the object of, picketing or boycott activity should be considered
carefully in the decision to adopt franchising as a distribution tech-
nique. Although no reported cases have raised the issue in the context
of franchising, the disposition of charges under section 8(b)(4)
frequently turns on the relationship between the primary employer—
the employer with whom the union has a dispute—and the allegedly
"neutral" or secondary employer. In Operating Engineers, Local 12, 17 '
a union threatened to picket a construction site when the employer
subcontracted excavation work to two individual nonunion, equipment
owner-operators. The trial examiner recommended that the union be
found in violation of sections 8(b) (4) (ii) (A) and (B). The Board
disagreed, finding that the owner-operators were sufficiently controlled
by the employer to qualify as statutory employees. The union was
protesting not the employer's business relationship with nonunion
employers, but rather, his employment of nonunion employees. There-
fore, the complainant was not a neutral employer for purposes of
section 8(b) (4).172 Since this section prohibits only the picketing of
neutral employers, the complaint was dismissed.
The implications for franchising are readily apparent. If the
171 168 N.L.R.B. No, 112, 67 L.R.R.M. 1019 (1967). See also Carpenters Local 2265,
170 N.L.R.B. No. 93, 67 L.R.R.M. 1557 (1968) where a union initiated organizational
Picketing at job sites in an attempt to organize allegedly independent installers who were
installing carpeting on contract with the employer. The employer charged the union
with violating § 8(b) (4) (ii) (B) on the theory that the union was coercing the employer
to restrain him from doing business with the independent contractor-installers. The Board
dismissed the complaint, finding that, since the employer retained the right to control
the way the installers performed their tasks, the installers were employees; the picketing
was not, therefore, interfering with the employer's relationships with other businessmen.
The principle is important in the franchising context. Picketing is a potent weapon
in attempts to organize employees; if the franchisor could successfully argue that his
franchisee-distributors were independent contractors, he could request an injunction
against picketing which interfered with his business relationship by alleging a violation
of 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). The employer-franchisor could also charge a violation of section
8(b)(7)(C), which prohibits organizational picketing unless the union files a petition
for a representation within a reasonable period of time (usually 30 days). However, the
charge would impliedly admit that the franchisees were employees, since 8(b)(7) only
regulates picketing for organizational purposes. The franchisor might be unwilling to
make that concession if he thinks he can persuade the NLRB that his franchisees are
independent contractors.
172 Operating Engineers, Local 12, 168 N.L.R.B. No. 112, 67 L.R.R.M. 1019, 1019-20
(1967).
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Board finds an employment rather than an independent contractor
relationship, the franchisor and franchisee cannot claim that picketing
activity directed at the franchisor is directed at a neutral employer.
The franchisor would be considered the only, and therefore the
primary, employer. Even if the franchisor successfully argues that
his franchisees are independent contractors, the union will contend
that their participation in the franchise program makes them "allies'
of the franchisor, or part of a "single integrated enterprise,'" and
that therefore the franchisor is not a neutral employer. Finally, if the
franchisor is characterized as the joint employer of the disputant-
employees, again, he would not be considered a neutral employer.'"
A union attempting to organize the employees of a franchisee
might attempt to picket the franchisor in order to bring additional
pressure on the franchisee and his employees. Under section 8(b) (7)
(C),' 7° organizational picketing may be carried on, but it will be
173
 Cf. Douds v. Metropolitan Federation of Architects, Engineers, Chemists and
Technicians, Local 231, 75 F. Supp, 672 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). The ally doctrine was approved
and adopted in NLRB v. Business Machines Local 459, 228 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1955). The
Board has declared that the ally doctrine is also applicable if the primary and secondary
employers, even though separate legal entities, are under common ownership and if
there is, in addition, such actual or active common (as distinguished from merely po-
tential) control as to denote an appreciable integration of operation and management
policies. Drivers, Chauffeurs and Helpers, Local 639, 158 N.L.R.B. No. 129, 62 L.R.R.M.
1197 (1966).
174
 For a description of the "single integrated enterprise" concept, see Vulcan
Materials Co. v. United Steelworkers of America, Local 2176, 430 F.2d 446, 74 L.R.R.M.
2818 (5th Cir. 1970). See also Okch Caterers, 179 N.L.R.B. No. 84, 72 L.R.R.M. 1405,
1406 (1969), (where three separately owned corporations indicated one facility as the
corporate address, used trucks covered by a common insurance policy, and supervised their
employees in common, they were termed a single integrated enterprise and treated
as joint employers of lessee drivers for purposes of jurisdictional standards) ; Welcome-
American Fertilizer Co., 169 N.L.R.B. No. 104, 67 L.R.R.M. 1484 (1968), (where a larger
company owned all the stock of the smaller company, four of five of the latter's Board
of Directors were employees of the former,' and the larger company trained employees
of the smaller and allowed them to participate in its fringe benefits program, the two
constituted a single integrated enterprise for purposes of determining NLRB jurisdiction
over an alleged violation of $ 8(a) (3) by the smaller company).
The Board has various short hand symbols to describe the single integrated enterprise.
For example, in Mutual Coal Co., Inc., 170 N.L.R.B. No. 27, 67 L,R.R.M. 1385 (1968),
where sublessees of a coal mine owner were contractually compelled to work under the
supervision of lessor's engineers and to deliver all coal mined to the lessor at his price,
the Board termed the lessee "an administrative segment" of the lessor. In Manley Transfer
Co., Inc., 164 N.L.R.B. No. 21, 65 L.R.R.M. 1194 (1967), the Board termed a sub-
contractor of the primary contractor a. "subordinate instrumentality" of the primary
contractor, where the subcontractor and the primary contractor were commonly owned.
Id. at 1196. In J. Howard Jenks, 165 N.L.R.B. No. 1, 65 L.R.R.M. 1228 (1967), the
Board held that an employer that had changed its name and corporate form, but had
remained under the ownership and control of a former employer found guilty of various
unfair labor practices, was the "alter ego" of the first employer.
175 Teamsters Local 559, 172 N.L.R.B. No. 35, 69 L.R.R.M. 1270 (1968).
17e 29 U.S.C.	 158(b)(7)(C) (1970).
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enjoined if the union fails to file a representation petition with a reason-
able time (usually thirty days). 177 Although the extent of the picketing
permitted by section 8(b) (7) (C) is unclear, it is possible that a union
could legitimately picket a joint employer of the target employees,
even though the latter were not present at the site of the picketing.'
Ironically, one union which engaged in the picketing of franchisees
defended against a section 8(b) (7) (C) complaint by attempting to
prove that the franchisees were independent contractors." If the
Board had accepted the union's contention, it would have lacked the
jurisdiction to seek an injunction against the picketing. Using the
right to control test, however, the Board determined that the fran-
chisees were employees and issued a remedial order.
In attempting to minimize the risks involved in a labor organiza-
tion's use of permissive picketing and boycotts, a franchisor is apt to
be caught in a double bind. If he ensures that his franchisees will be
characterized as independent contractors, he will be unable to avail
himself of the protection of 8(b) (7). 180 Furthermore, even if the
franchisees are characterized as independent contractors, they will
probably not be characterized as neutral employers for the purposes
of the protective provisions of section 8 (h) (4), because they are either
allies of the franchisor or part of a single integrated enterprise."'
If, on the other hand, the franchisees are characterized as employees,
the franchisor cannot seek to enjoin union activities under section
8(b) (4) since there exists only one primary employer—the franchisor
—rather than both primary and neutral employers.' A finding that
the franchisees and franchisor are joint employers similarly neutralizes
177 29 U.S.C.	 158(b) (7) (C) (1970).
178 See Dunau, Some Aspects of the Current Interpretation of Section s(b) (7), 52
Geo. L.J. 220 (1964) ; Note, Illegal Picketing Under Section 8(b) (7)—A Reexamination,
68 Colum. L. Rev. 745 (1968).
179 In Sheet Metal Workers, Local 283, 172 N.L.R.B. No. 76, 69 L.R.R.M. 1174
(1968), where the union was attempting to organize installers of air conditioning units,
organizational picketing was carried on for more than 30 days without the union filing
a representation petition. The union was charged with a violation of 8(b) (7) (C),
which prohibits organizational picketing for more than 30 days unless a representation
petition is filed. The union defended against the charge by contending that the installers
were not employees and that, therefore, the picketing was not organizational picketing
forbidden by 8(b)(7)(C). The Board, however, disagreed, finding that the installers
were employees and that the picketing was thus proscribed by II 8(b) (7)(C).
180 Thus, for example, in Sheet Metal Workers, Local 283, supra note 179, if the
contractor had created indicia of independent contractor status for the installers, he
could not have invoked 11 8(b) (7) (C).
181 See supra note 174 and cases cited therein.
182 See, e.g., Local 559, Internet Brotherhood of Teamsters, 172 N.L.R.B. No. 35,
69 L.R.R.M. 1270 (1968), in which the Board held that where a manufacturer distributed
his products through a subsidiary which he controlled, a union in dispute with: the
subsidiary was not prohibited by 8(b) (4) from picketing the plant of the parent
manufacurer, since the two employers were considered one for the purposes of ij 8(b) (4).
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the franchisor's possible protection against being involved in his f ran
chisee's labor disputes.'" The same result would follow if the fran-
chisees were characterized as supervisors. Thus, the franchisor's only
protection would be that normally available to an employer whose
premises are subject to picketing. The franchisor of either single
distributors or large enterprises should not assume that he will receive
the added protection afforded to a neutral employer.
D. Transferring the Franchise: The Problem of the
Successor Franchisee
A distingushing feature of the franchise relationship is the
opportunity it provides the inexperienced entrepreneur to invest in a
business enterprise which, with the franchisor's help, he can build and
eventually sell at a substantial profit.'" If the franchisee is a single
distributor, and the contract permits, he will encounter no problem
with federal labor legislation in disposing of his franchise interest.
Where the franchisor and franchisee are joint employers of organized
employees, however, the joint employer doctrine may well be used to
transfer the contractual and statutory obligations of a franchisee-
employer to his successor in interest. The importance of the joint
employer doctrine in the franchise context may best be illustrated by
comparing two cases dealing with the refusal of a successor employer
to bargain with a union recognized by his predecessor.
In Ramada inns, Inc.,'" the owner of a Ramada franchise
contracted with a second franchisee, Ramada Inc., whereby the latter
agreed to operate the motel's restaurant. Shortly after beginning to
operate the restaurant, Ramada Inc. was presented with a demand
for recognition by a union representing a majority of the restaurant
employees. The entire franchise was then assumed by a successor who
retained the franchise agreement with Ramada Inc. Some six months
after the union's original demand, during which time Ramada Inc.
had refused to bargain with the union, Ramada Inc. assigned the
restaurant franchise to another franchisee named Maalouf. The union
made a bargaining demand on Maalouf which he refused. The union
then filed a charge under section 8(a) (5). 180
General Counsel issued a complaint against Maalouf on the
ground that Ramada Inc. had unlawfully refused to recognize and
bargain with the union in response to the original demand, and that
as successor to Ramada, Maalouf had an obligation to remedy his
predecessor's unfair labor practice. The majority opinion of the Board,
183 Id.
184 See pp. 220-21, 235 supra.
185 171 N.L.R.B. No. 115, 68 L.R.RM. 1209 (1968).
180 id.
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while conceding that Ramada Inc. had violated section 8(a) (5),
stated that: "Ramada's prior unlawful refusal to bargain cannot .. .
be attributed to Maalouf. The Board has never held that an unfair
labor practice develops [sic] upon a bona fide purchaser of a business
simply by reason of successorship. . . ." 187
There was no suggestion in Ramada Inns that the franchisor was
the joint employer of the restaurant employees. But if joint employer
status had been established, an argument could have been proffered
similar to that used by the General Counsel in Ref-Chem Co.' 88 There
the Board found that a series of subcontractors, working under con-
tract with El Paso Corp., were joint employers, with El Paso, of the
unit employees. The original subcontractor had negotiated a contract
which his successor refused to observe. The Board found that the
latter subcontractor had violated section 8(a) (5) by refusing both
to recognize the union and to observe the original agreement. 189
 The
Board's theory was that the obligation to observe the original agree-
ment remained constant in the joint employer, Ref-Chem, and that the
agreement had been assumed in turn by each of the subcontractors. 1"
Although granting that the evidence established that the subcon-
tractors and El Paso were joint employers, the court of appeals re-
jected the Board's theory of the case:
[T] he Board did not set out case authority, nor are we
furnished with any in this court, sustaining the use of the
joint employer doctrine to pass the obligation to bargain
from one employer to another by means of their common but
successive joint employer, where none of the employers is a
successor or alter ego of another."'
The qualification offered by the court in the final clause suggests
that where successorship in the labor law sense occurs—i.e., when
187 Id .
, 68 L.R.R.M. at 1211. Although the Board perhaps had not used the joint
employer doctrine to impose an obligation to bargain on a successor employer, the quoted
majority statement is inaccurate. In Perma Vinyl Corp., 164 N.L.R.B. No. 119, 65
L.R.R.M. 1168 (1967), the Board held that "Rlo further the public interest involved in
effectuating the policies of the Act and achieve the 'objectives of national labor policy,
reflected in established principles of federal law,' we are persuaded that one who
acquires and operates a business of an employer found guilty of unfair labor practices
in basically unchanged form under circumstances which charge him with notice of
unfair labor practice charges against his predecessor should be held responsible for
remedying his predecessor's unlawful conduct." Id. at 1169. In addition, in Overnite
Transportation Co., Inc., 157 N.L.R.B. No. 103, 61 L.R.R.M. 1520 (1966), the Board
found a violation of $ 8(a)(5) where the successor employer changed the condition of
employment without bargaining with the incumbent union.
188 169 N.L.R.B. No. 45, 67 L.R.R.M. 1220 (1968).
180 Id., 67 L.R.R.M. at 1227.
100 Id., 67 L.R.R.M. at 1226.
191 Ref-Chem Co. v. NLRB, 418 F.2d 127, 129 (5th Cir. 1969).
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"assets and employees are transferred from one employer to another
and the identity of the employing enterprise remains substantially
intact,”102—the contractual obligations of a franchisee might well be
preserved and passed on by a common franchisor-joint employer.
If the successor to a franchisee must undertake an obligation to
bargain with an existing unit, or even, perhaps to honor an existing
collective bargaining agreement, the value of the franchise will be
discounted accordingly. Although successor franchisees should be held
to the same obligations as other successor employers, it is doubtful
that any useful purpose would be served by imposing additional
obligations through an ingenuous use of the joint employer doctrine.
CONCLUSION
This article has attempted to demonstrate that franchising is a
unique type of business association which does not neatly fit the
National Labor Relations Act formulary used to characterize and
regulate the interaction between employers and employees. The
master-servant—purchaser-independent contractor conceptualization of
the employment relationship does not generally reflect market realities
and is particularly ill-adapted to the evaluation and classification of the
franchise method of distribution. It has been suggested that the func-
tional determinants of the franchise relationship cannot be measured
by the common law right to control test. Rather, they should be as-
sessed by the degree of entrepreneurial risk and opportunity involved
in a particular franchise. Specifically, the determination of whether a
franchisee is an employee of the franchisor should turn on the amount
of the franchisee's capital investment in the franchise and on his ability
to assign his interest for a profit. Similarly, the characterization of a
franchisor as the joint employer of the franchisee's employees should
depend upon his continuing financial interest in the franchise and his
power to protect this interest by direct and indirect measures rather
than by his right to control the labor relations of the franchisee.
To some degree, the National Labor Relations Board has focused
on the realities, rather than the rhetoric, of franchising. In some cases
the Board has characterized the franchisee as an employee in terms of
the economic realities that determine his relationship to the franchisor.
It has also, for the most part, tied the franchisor to the franchisee-
employer because of the former's general influence over the wages,
hours and working conditions of the franchisee's employees. How-
ever, the Board's decisions,- while sensitive to the economics and
politics of franchising, are frequently criticized by the courts for fail-
192 Id. See also Perma Vinyl Corp., 164 N.L.R.B. No. 119, 65 L.R.R.M. 1168 (1967)
discussed at note 187 supra.
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ing to adhere to legislative rules and definitions. It has been suggested
that this criticism could, in part, be avoided if the Board were to
indicate clearly the principles of law and business realities underlying
its decisions.
The necessity for a reevaluation of the criteria used to determine
the applicability of the NLRA in the franchising context is evidenced
by the considerable impact which an affirmative jurisdictional finding
has upon the franchising relationship. The application of the NLRA
often determines the legitimacy or utility of franchising as a method
of distribution. Franchising programs implemented by an employer
to avoid the obligations imposed by the Act have been consistently
struck down by the Board. Moreover, franchisees have been required to
bargain for structural and other changes affecting their employees with
union representatives, and have been held responsible for remedying
labor law violations of their predecessors.
On the whole, the` law as developed by the NLRB has made
franchising a less attractive business form for franchisors than it
otherwise might be. The characterization of the franchisor as an em-
ployer or joint employer partially vitiates several of the primary
purposes of most franchising programs: (1) the elimination of close
management supervision, (2) flexibility in dealing with enfranchised
distributors, (3) the conservation of economic power vis-à-vis dis-
tributors and (4) complete legal divorce from the franchisee. While
franchisors and franchisees should legitimately be expected to bear
their share of the economic burdens levied by social legislation such
as the NLRA, they are both entitled to a more realistic appraisal of
their status in terms of the objectives of the Act before these burdens
are imposed.
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